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Allocation in the context of this report refers to the entire process through which state-subsidised 
housing opportunities are distributed to eligible (nor non-eligible) individuals or households, 
including registration, project identification, beneficiary selection and subsidy application.1 It is 
important to note that there are other types of housing or land allocation in South Africa, which 
operate in addition to state allocation for subsidised houses. These include inter alia: market 
allocation, self allocation, traditional authority allocation and community allocation.2
Allocation Committee 
An Allocation Committee is described by the National Housing Allocation Strategy as a committee 
comprising municipal and provincial officials formed to make decisions about the allocation of houses in 
state-subsidised housing projects. The Allocation Committee must comprise at minimum two members 
from the Office of the City or the Municipal Manager as well as two members from the provincial 
department of housing. No political office-bearers are allowed to sit on the Allocation Committee. 
Application
Application in the context of this report refers to the process through which an individual or 
household applies for a housing subsidy, bearing in mind that there are specific eligibility criteria 
that must be fulfilled in order to qualify.3 The status of a subsidy application can be tracked via the 
Housing Subsidy System (HSS). 
C-Form (officially known as a Form C)
A C-form is a housing waiting list registration receipt that was used as proof that someone was 
registered on the waiting list. Many people who registered for housing did so in 1996 and 1997. In 
Gauteng in 2008 the C-form was replaced with a computer-generated demand database receipt; 
however it is up to people to register on the demand database.
Community Liaison Officer (CLO)
A CLO is appointed by a municipality to facilitate communication between community members and 
government on specific projects. For example, CLOs are appointed as the liaison between the contractor 
appointed on a housing project, the municipality and the community. The ward councillor is often 
responsible for the selection of CLOs, however CLOs are meant to be seen as neutral by all parties involved.
Demand Database
A demand database is a repository of information about households and individuals that have 
expressed a need for subsidised housing opportunities, capturing all the eligibility information 
required. A demand database can operate at municipal, provincial and national level. Different 
registers for certain ‘housing products’ can be drawn from the database, based on specific criteria 
1  M Tshangana ‘Allocation of subsidized housing opportunities to households in the Western 
Cape by municipalities’ paper presented at Southern African Housing Foundation International 
Conference, Exhibition & Housing Awards (11-14 October 2009) p. 3.
2  L Royston and R Eglin ‘Allocation Thought Piece for Managed Land Settlement’ (December 
2011) p. 3.
3  Ibid.
SERI Housing inside Final to print.indd   3 2013/07/03   10:27:19 AM
‘Jumping the Queue,’ Waiting Lists and Other Myths (2013)
4
selected. The City of Cape Town has a housing database, while the Western Cape maintains its own 
housing demand database – referred to in this report as the Western Cape Housing Demand Database 
(WCHDD). Gauteng also has a Housing Demand Database (HDD), which was established in 2008.
Housing Subsidy
A housing subsidy is a once-off grant paid by government to qualifying beneficiaries for housing 
purposes. The grant is not paid in cash to beneficiaries but, rather, is paid to the seller of a house 
or, in new subsidised housing developments, the grant is used to construct a house which is then 
registered in the name of the beneficiary in the Deeds Office.
Housing Subsidy Application Form 
The Housing Subsidy Application Form is a form that prospective beneficiaries of state-subsidised 
houses must fill in to apply for a housing subsidy. There are different forms for different subsidies; 
however the 2009 National Housing Code contains a generic application form for all subsidies.4
Housing Subsidy System (HSS)
The HSS is an information system that records the progress of subsidy allocations made in terms 
of the various national housing programmes. It is the main operational and administrative tool 
through which subsidies are allocated in terms of the NHSS. The HSS is managed at national level by 
the Department of Human Settlements (DHS) and by provinces, and it allows users to register, edit 
and verify applications, as well as capture budgetary information for the different housing projects. 
Informal Settlement
Statistics South Africa (Stats SA) defines an informal settlement as “an unplanned settlement on 
land which has not been surveyed or proclaimed as residential, consisting mainly of informal 
dwellings (shacks).”5 Informal settlements can typically be identified on the basis of the following 
characteristics: illegality and informality; inappropriate locations; restricted public and private sector 
investment; poverty and vulnerability; and social stress.6
National Housing Needs Register (NHNR)
The NHNR is a web-based system operating out of DHS but used by some accredited municipalities 
and provincial housing departments. The NHNR aims to capture the housing needs information of 
individuals and households, pre-screen them for eligibility and then use the information to assist 
with the allocation of housing opportunities. The NHNR is based on household surveys administered 
by fieldworkers and loaded onto the system, which is linked to the HSS. While it is a national system, 
provincial officials are trained on how to use the NHNR and are responsible for registering people 
and updating information on the NHNR. 
National Housing Subsidy Database (NHSDB)
The NHSDB records all approved housing subsidy beneficiaries and it is linked to the HSS. The purpose of 
the database is to prevent fraud in the form of households receiving more than one subsidy allocation. It 
includes information on all historical and current subsidies granted to individuals in South Africa. 
4 See DHS ‘Integrated Residential Development Programme’ Volume 4, Part 3 of the National 
Housing Code (2009) pp. 67-71.
5 Housing Development Agency (HDA) ‘South Africa: Informal settlements status’ (2012) p. 18.
6 DHS ‘Upgrading of Informal Settlements Programme’ Volume 4, Part 3 of the National Housing 
Code (2009) p. 16.
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National Housing Subsidy Scheme (NHSS)
The NHSS is the cornerstone of government’s housing delivery programme, which provides capital 
subsidies for housing to qualifying beneficiary households to take full ownership. The NHSS 
currently consists of the individual subsidy, Integrated Residential Development Programme (IRDP), 
consolidation subsidy, institutional subsidy and rural subsidy.
Project Steering Committee (PSC)
A PSC is established for a provincial or municipal housing project and is meant to serve as a community 
interface mechanism to facilitate communication with the community on matters pertaining to a 
project, including the selection of prospective beneficiaries and the subsidy application process and 
approvals.7 PSCs often comprise the following stakeholders: provincial and/or municipal officials, 
representatives of the beneficiary community, councillors and project consultants.
Reference Number 
A reference number in the context of this report refers to the number that the HSS allocates to a 
specific subsidy application e.g. BORKN96110453. It is purely an administrative number related to 
the application and does not refer to a site or a house. Housing waiting list receipts or C forms also 
include a reference number, which is also purely administrative. 
Registration 
Registration is the process by which people place themselves on the waiting list or housing demand 
database in their specific municipality or province. 
Shack
A shack is a form of informal housing prevalent in South African informal settlements and in the backyards 
of formal housing. Stats SA differentiates between these two categories of shacks in its surveys.
Title Deed 
A title deed is a legal document that reflects the proof of ownership of a property. A copy of the title 
deed is kept at the Deeds Office, and anyone can check who owns a property. All state-subsidised 
houses are supposed to be registered on the deeds registry; however there is a huge backlog which 
means that many households have not received title deeds to their homes.
Waiting List
A waiting list is a register (or part of a register) usually arranged in date order from oldest to most 
recent registration date.8 In Gauteng, the waiting list was a computerised database system previously 
used by the provincial department and municipalities to record particulars of households in need of 
housing assistance, but this has been replaced by the HDD.9
7 DHS ‘Strategy for the Allocation of Housing Opportunities Created through the National 
Housing Programmes’ (2008) pp. 15-16. 
8 Tshangana ‘Allocation of subsidized housing opportunities to households in the Western Cape 
by municipalities’ p. 5.
9 GDLGH ‘Gauteng Housing Demand Database and Allocation Policy’ press release (June 2011) p. 8.
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Since 1994 the South African government, through its National Housing Subsidy 
Scheme (NHSS), has embarked on the large-scale provision of state-subsidised housing 
to low-income households across the country. Over 2 million state-subsidised houses 
have been built during this period, predominantly through the project-linked subsidy 
programme.10 These houses have been mainly constructed in typical greenfield11 
housing projects, with developers building houses for eventual ownership by qualifying 
beneficiaries in terms of the NHSS. The delivery of these houses – also known as RDP or 
BNG houses12 - has been, and continues to be, an important political drawcard in South 
Africa, forming part of the post-apartheid project 
to redress the historical, socio-economic injustices 
of apartheid. The ‘eradication of the housing 
backlog’ is as much a political target, as a broader 
developmental goal.13 
However, despite noteworthy gains since 1994, 
there is still a substantial ‘housing backlog’, 
which has become one of the reasons for the 
mushrooming of local ‘service delivery’ protests 
across South Africa in recent years. As individuals and families attach much of their 
“emotional and economic well-being to the attainment of a formal house, tensions 
around housing delivery processes are almost inevitable.”14 Indeed, housing delivery 
has become highly politicised and subject to politicking and protest throughout the 
10 The actual number of houses built since 1994 is disputed.  See section 3.3 below for more on this.
11 A greenfield housing development is one where new construction occurs on a piece of 
previously undeveloped land.
12 RDP is a reference to the Reconstruction and Development Programme of 1994, while BNG 
refers to the Breaking New Ground plan launched in 2004.
13 See M Huchzermeyer ‘Pounding at the Tip of the Iceberg: The Dominant Politics of Informal 
Settlement Eradication in South Africa’ Politikon: South African Journal of Political Studies 37, 1 
(2010) pp. 129-148. 
14 Centre for Social Science Research (CSSR) ‘The Social Consequences of Establishing ‘Mixed’ 
Neighbourhoods: Does the mechanism for selecting beneficiaries for low-income housing 
projects affect the quality of the ensuing ‘community’ and the likelihood of violent conflict?’ 
(May 2010) p. 36
Introduction1
“The dominant discourse around 
housing delivery is that there 
is a ‘waiting list system’ which 
constitutes a housing ‘queue’, and 
that people must wait patiently until 
their name is chosen in terms of a 
rational process of ‘first come first 
served’.”
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Section 1: Introduction 
country, particularly in the context of medium-to-large state-subsidised housing 
projects undertaken by provincial housing departments. 
The dominant discourse around housing delivery is that there is a ‘waiting list system’ 
which constitutes a housing ‘queue’, and that people must wait patiently until their 
name comes up in terms of a rational process of ‘first come first served’. Any perversion 
of this system is referred to as ‘queue-jumping’, and this term is consistently evoked 
by politicians and government officials. Anti-Land Invasion Units have been set up 
in various municipalities, which operate on this premise and use the rhetoric of ‘the 
queue’ to justify evicting people from land, houses or buildings they occupy. There is an 
assumption, often unarticulated, amongst the public that the system in place operates 
in a rational way. For example, the assumption is that if 10 houses are being built, then 
the first 10 people who applied on ‘the waiting list’ will receive houses. While recent 
housing demand databases - implemented in Gauteng and the Western Cape – and 
the National Housing Needs Register (NHNR) - used by other provinces - incorporate 
other criteria like location, special needs, age etc, 
the assumption remains that, taking these into 
account, perhaps 10 people in the top 25 will get 
houses. Both these assumptions, in most cases, 
appear to be wrong and the ‘housing waiting list’ 
does not exist or function in any way that it is 
understood to exist or function.
One reason for this continued myth is that both 
the modality and rhetoric of the NHSS, the project-
linked subsidy programme and RDP housing 
projects are extremely pervasive. In a sense the 
language used to describe processes put in place 
to deal with a very specific type of housing programme has ‘colonised’ all other housing 
programmes, even though there are in fact numerous entry points for allocation into 
the state’s systems of housing delivery besides typical RDP housing projects, including 
informal settlement upgrading, emergency housing, social housing and Community 
Residential Units (CRU). Further, in reality, it appears that a very high percentage of 
people who actually receive state-subsidised houses engage in informal transfers, either 
renting or selling their houses for cash, and move back to shacks in backyards or informal 
settlements to be close to economic and social opportunities. This phenomenon has 
been heavily criticised by government; however given the complexities of housing need 
in South Africa, it is not surprising. What is needed is a new public discourse on housing, 
and a more complex and nuanced way of characterising the rational, appropriate and 
humane responses to the broad range of housing needs in South Africa, which are not 
currently catered for by the market.
 “In a sense the language used to 
describe processes put in place 
to deal with a very specific type 
of housing programme have 
‘colonised’ all other housing 
programmes, even though there are 
in fact numerous entry points for 
allocation into the state’s systems 
of housing delivery besides typical 
RDP housing projects...”
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Housing allocation, while loosely regulated by numerous policies and systems, appears 
to be fundamentally about access to resources and power, and has little to do with 
individual housing needs.15 The failures of and politicking around housing provision are 
exacerbated by the fact that the South African housing delivery programme is widely 
perceived as extremely corrupt. Research shows that these perceptions relate not only 
to the amount of real corruption that has been exposed over the years,16 but also to 
the “clumsiness, opacity, confusion and capriciousness that exists within the housing 
programme”.17 Although maladministration, fraud and corruption certainly exist and 
appear to be widespread, it also appears that much of the anger and confusion – 
which often culminates in protest - arises from a lack of information and explanation 
of some very technical and banal processes and systems. According to the Public 
Protector, during 2011/2012, “approximately 10 percent of all complaints received by 
the Public Protector were related to maladministration pertaining to the delivery of 
the low cost housing.”18 Numerous problems with procurement, allocation and post-
allocation of state-subsidised houses were identified.19 Indeed, while there have been 
several challenges with the size, quality, location and allocation of subsidised houses, the 
allocation of houses has been particularly contested terrain. 
While there are numerous national, provincial and local government policies, systems, 
tools, databases and processes in place to determine ‘housing demand’ and ostensibly 
assist with the allocation of state-subsidised houses to qualifying beneficiaries, this 
terrain is very opaque and is dominated by myths, misinformation and confusion, which 
has led to protests, ‘illegal’ occupation of newly built or unfinished RDP houses, and 
court cases. These policies and processes feed into the prevailing discourse that there 
is a rational system in place around housing delivery and allocation, and that there 
is very little, if any, space to contest current practice. There is further tension around 
the fact that, while a particular mode of delivering and allocating houses is extremely 
entrenched in government and public discourse, over the past years there have been 
statements made by the Minister of Human Settlements, Tokyo Sexwale, about the 
15 Royston and Eglin ‘Allocation Thought Piece for Managed Land Settlement’ p. 5.
16 For an example of this, in the Minister’s recent Human Settlements Budget Vote speech he 
stated that “regarding public servants in all three spheres of government who committed 
housing subsidy related misconduct and fraud, more than 290 have been arrested, over 
240 found guilty, and over 220 are facing internal disciplinary action. Nearly R30 million lost 
through corrupt activities has been recovered”. T Sexwale ‘Address by the Minister of Human 
Settlements, Tokyo Sexwale, on the occasion of the Human Settlements Budget Vote, National 
Assembly’ (9 May 2012).
17 M Rubin ‘Perceived Corruption in the South African Housing Allocation and Delivery Programme: 
What It May Mean for Accessing the State’ Journal of Asian and African Studies 46, 5 (2011) p. 488.
18 Public Protector ‘Presentation Presentation to the Portfolio Committee on Human Settlements 
by the Public Protector Adv TN Madonsela’ (20 February 2013).
19 Ibid.
SERI Housing inside Final to print.indd   8 2013/07/03   10:27:20 AM
9
Section 1: Introduction 
government’s shift away from delivering subsidised houses.20 These statements have 
been met with criticism from various quarters21 and show up current contradictions and 
tensions around housing delivery in South Africa, and the need for honest reflection and 
nuanced responses by government.  
This report aims to investigate some of the current assumptions and practice around 
housing demand and allocation in South Africa. While overviewing the national situation 
and processes undertaken by the national Department of Human Settlements (DHS)22, 
our research also focuses on the Gauteng and Western Cape provinces, primarily because 
these provinces have designed their own housing demand databases and because they 
face some of the heaviest demand in terms of housing delivery (due to two main cities, 
Johannesburg and Cape Town, being located there). Furthermore, these provinces are 
currently experiencing the shift of their housing-related powers and functions from 
provincial departments to accredited municipalities. 
In spite of the high political profile of subsidised housing provision in South Africa, and 
its simultaneous contribution to poverty alleviation (when it is correctly provided) and 
public unrest (when it is not), there is a surprising dearth of consolidated information 
and research around the programmes, policies and practices, particularly the selection 
and allocation process, e.g. what and how selection criteria are used by municipalities 
and provincial departments to ‘choose’ beneficiaries for subsidised houses; municipal 
selection policy and practice in general; and the institutional context in which beneficiary 
selection and allocation takes place.23 The research informing this report attempts to fill 
a few of these gaps, highlighting the complexity and opaqueness of various policies, 
processes and practices operating at national and provincial levels. This report thus 
attempts to provide some much-needed analysis about housing demand and allocation 
policies and systems operating in South Africa.
20 See, for example, A Majavu ‘Sexwale: ‘Housing for poor is not sustainable’’ Sowetan (27 
September 2011); M Mnyakama ‘Sexwale says free housing ride has to come to an end!’ Daily 
Sun (10 May 2012).
21 See, for example, I Mahabane ‘What is the purpose of this gigantic state?’ Business Day (30 
September 2011); A Majavu ‘Sexwale comment blasted’ Sowetan (3 October 2011).
22 In 2009, the National Department of Housing (NDoH) changed its name to the Department of 
Human Settlements (DHS).
23 Tshangana ‘Allocation of subsidized housing opportunities to households in the Western Cape 
by municipalities’ p. 10. Two exceptions include research conducted by the Human Sciences 
Research Council (HSRC) for the Eastern Cape province, which touches on demand databases 
and housing delivery in the province (in the context of assessing demand and backlogs more 
broadly): HSRC ‘A Rapid Verification Study on the Informal Settlements and Backyard Shacks, 
Backlog and Trends within the Eastern Cape’ (April 2010) pp. 93-95; as well Tshangana ‘Allocation 
of subsidized housing opportunities to households in the Western Cape by municipalities’.
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Structure of the report
Section 2 of the report describes the multi-pronged methodological approach used for 
the research. 
Section 3 provides a brief overview of the South African housing context from 1995 to 
present, describing some of the policy shifts and summarising four important national 
housing programmes: the Emergency Housing Programme, Upgrading of Informal 
Settlements Programme (UISP), Social Housing Policy, Community Residential Units 
(CRU) Programme and the Integrated Residential Development Programme (IRDP). 
Section 4 of this report describes current housing demand and allocation policies and 
systems, charting the shift from the housing waiting list system to demand databases at 
national, provincial and local level, focusing on the Gauteng and Western Cape provinces. 
Section 5 of the report analyses some of the systemic problems with current policies and 
processes, highlighting the following: problems with the waiting list system, problems 
with demand databases, problems with the Housing Subsidy System (HSS) and the 
National Housing Subsidy Database (NHSDB), problems with the allocation of houses 
(e.g. informal transfers/sales and maladministration, fraud and corruption), and finally, 
problems around municipal accreditation. 
Section 6 provides a conclusion to the report and posits some recommendations for 
key stakeholders. 
Section 7 of the report contains an extensive bibliography. 
Section 8 is an annexure that provides more information on housing legislation and policy 
in South Africa, specifically on the Housing Act, municipal accreditation and the NHSS.
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We used a multi-pronged methodological approach for this research report. First, we 
conducted a desktop review of all applicable legislation, policies and strategies relating 
to housing demand and allocation in South Africa. We also analysed a number of 
relevant research reports, academic articles, press releases, speeches, forensic reports 
and media articles. This process gave us a broad overview of the legal and policy terrain, 
as well as the history of waiting lists and demand databases in the country. 
Second, in February and March 2012 we conducted interviews with government officials 
at national, provincial and local level, including officials from the City of Cape Town, West 
Rand Municipality, Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality and Ekurhuleni Metropolitan 
Municipality as well as officials from the Western Cape Department of Human Settlements 
(WCDHS), the Gauteng Department of Local Government and Housing (GDLGH), and, 
finally, the DHS.24 We also conducted interviews with academics working in the field of 
housing rights and development in South Africa. We were fortunate to be invited to a 
workshop on 23 February 2012, hosted by the National Human Settlements Research 
Task Team located within DHS, on the topic “Allocation of housing opportunities”. A 
number of representatives from DHS, provincial housing departments and municipalities 
were present, which contributed towards a very interesting discussion on housing 
demand and allocation in South Africa. 
Third, we held a number of focus group discussions in Gauteng and the Western Cape 
to gain insight into how community members, CBOs and NGOs understand the housing 
waiting lists, demand databases and housing allocation. These focus groups aimed at 
eliciting community and civil society perceptions to counterbalance perspectives from 
government officials. In Gauteng, we conducted three focus group discussions: the 
first with residents of an informal settlement who had registered on the HDD and who 
should, in their view, have been allocated houses in a nearby housing development;25 
24  We have chosen to keep the identities of these officials anonymous in this report.
25 This focus group discussion was held on 8 March 2012, hosted by SERI in Johannesburg and 
was attended by eight residents of the Winnie Mandela informal settlement, located in Tembisa 
on the East Rand in Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality. Most of the residents are also 
members of the Ekurhuleni Concerned Residents (ECR). The focus group participants all had 
experiences with registering for housing over the years and interacting with housing allocation 
processes in several nearby projects. Much of what they raised related to fraud and corruption, 
lack of information provided to residents, false promises to set up forums of communication, 
2 Methodology
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the second with NGOs, academics and consultants to elicit a more systemic, birds-eye 
analysis;26 and the third with community leaders, social movements and CSOs to get 
a sense of the issues facing those assisting poor individuals and communities around 
land and housing issues.27 In the Western Cape, three focus group discussions were also 
held: the first with NGOs and CBOs working with communities on housing issues in the 
province;28 and the second and third with a number of residents of poor communities 
who had registered on waiting lists and were yet to be allocated houses.29 
Finally, a roundtable seminar was held on 26 April 2012 in Cape Town, attended by a 
range of stakeholders from government, civil society and academia.30 At the roundtable 
seminar, CLC and SERI presented findings from research conducted in the Western Cape 
and Gauteng. The aim of the seminar was to obtain feedback on the findings, to share 
insights on housing demand and allocation, and to explore challenges facing individuals 
and communities in accessing decent housing, particularly around registering for 
housing and subsequent allocation. The findings and insights from this roundtable 
seminar were then integrated into the final report.
etc. The community provided documentation they had collected over the years, which shows 
their numerous attempts to engage government at various levels over housing allocation.
26 This focus group was held on 22 March 2012 at SERI’s office, with 12 participants attending. The 
aim of this discussion was to get a sense of what some of the key issues are regarding housing 
demand and allocation in Gauteng, from the perspective of NGOs, support organisations, 
academics and consultants. We wanted to know what they knew and thought about the 
current policy framework, the HDD and current allocation processes within local, provincial and 
national government. The discussion also provided an opportunity to find out what alternatives 
to the current system are being advocated by CSOs, and how they position their housing-
related work in relation to the state processes of allocation and delivery. The discussion was 
extremely lively and provided useful insight into the lack of clarity and understanding of the 
HDD among people who are familiar with housing policy and delivery processes. The HDD as an 
administrative tool was discussed, and many participants were critical of the way government in 
South Africa conceptualises housing, housing needs and the centralised administrative process.
27 This focus group discussion was held on 23 March 2012 at SERI’s office, attended by 17 people 
representing different communities, CBOs and social movements in the Gauteng region. The 
aim of the discussion was to get a sense of the challenges CBOs and community leaders face 
when assisting community members around housing issues. Some of the topics highlighted 
during the discussion were: lack of information on housing policy, particularly around allocation; 
lack of effective communication between the municipality/province, councillors  and the 
community; local politics and corruption; and housing systems not taking into consideration 
housing needs/demand despite the HDD.  
28  On 23 March 2012, a discussion involving 9 representatives from NGOs and CBOs working with 
communities was held at CLC’s offices.
29 Two focus group discussions were held on 19 and 20 March 2012 with community members 
and leaders from Mandela Park, Khayelitsha and Blue Downs, Belhar. The main purpose of these 
interviews was to gather information on the lived experiences of individuals and communities 
who have registered on waiting lists and the HDD, and are waiting to be allocated a subsidised 
house. The exercise was also intended to gauge the level of satisfaction of individuals and 
communities with current systems and processes.
30  The roundtable discussion – entitled Housing Allocation and the Housing Demand Database 
(HDD) System in South Africa - included representatives from GDLGH, WCDHS, City of Cape 
Town, SERI, CLC, Women’s Legal Centre (WLC), Development Action Group (DAG), Planact, South 
African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC), Gugulethu Backyarders, Mandela Park Backyarders, 
ILRIG, Blue Downs community and the Right to Know Campaign (R2K), amongst others. 
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The housing terrain in South Africa is extremely complex, with numerous laws, policies, 
programmes, subsidies and processes in place.31 This section provides a brief overview 
of the housing context in South Africa, and how it has shifted since 1994, with a view 
to locating the substantive discussions later on in the report. The section describes the 
building of RDP houses from 1995-2003; the Breaking New Ground policy amendment 
and period from 2004-2009, including a summary of the following national housing 
programmes: Emergency Housing Programme, Upgrading of Informal Settlements 
Programme (UISP), Social Housing Policy, Community Residential Units (CRU) Programme 
and Integrated Residential Development Programme (IRDP); and finally, describes the 
period after 2009 and the implementation to date of the Outcome 8 humans settlements 
delivery agreement.
In recognition of the importance of housing, the South African Constitution contains a 
right of access to adequate housing in section 26 of the Bill of Rights.32 The 1994 White 
Paper on Housing, which was published following extensive negotiations at the National 
Housing Forum (1992-1994), laid out the post-apartheid government’s ambitious 
housing policy and development target of building 1 million state-funded houses in five 
years. The White Paper on Housing and policy were informed by the African National 
Congress (ANC)’s Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), and hence the 
houses built under this policy are generally referred to as ‘RDP houses’. 
While national housing policy principles and strategies are contained in the White Paper 
on Housing, it is the Housing Act 107 of 1997 and the National Housing Code that 
are the principal instruments enacted to give effect to the constitutional obligations 
of the various organs of state. The Housing Act is framework legislation that contains 
general principles applicable to housing development; defines the functions of national, 
31  This section draws from K Tissington ‘A Resource Guide to Housing in South Africa 1994-2010: 
Legislation, Policy, Programmes and Practice’ (February 2011).
32 Section 26 of the Bill of Rights states that:
26(1) Everyone has the right to have access to adequate housing. 
(2)  The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available 
resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of this right.
(3)   No one may be evicted from their home, or have their home demolished, without an 
order of court made after considering all the relevant circumstances. No legislation may 
permit arbitrary evictions.
Overview of the  
South African Housing 
Context: 1995-present
3
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provincial and local governments in respect of housing development; and lays the basis 
for financing national housing programmes (see section 8.1 in the annexure below for 
more on the Housing Act). The National Housing Code contains the national housing 
policy and programmes. It was first published in October 2000, and substantially revised 
and republished in 2009.33
A cornerstone of the early housing policy was the National Housing Subsidy Scheme 
(NHSS), which was introduced after 1994 and provides once-off capital subsidy assistance 
to low-income households earning below a certain amount per month. The NHSS has 
developed over the years and comprises a number of ways in which the state housing 
subsidy can be ‘delivered’ to assist households gain access to different housing options. 
There is a set of generic qualifying criteria that must be fulfilled by those applying for 
housing subsidies under the NHSS. These include that the beneficiary must be: lawfully 
resident in South Africa (i.e. a citizen or in possession of a permanent residence permit); 
competent to contract; a first time property owner; be married/cohabiting or be single 
with financial dependents; and have a monthly income not exceeding R3 500. The 
Housing Subsidy System (HSS) is the information system that records the progress of 
subsidy allocations made in terms of the NHSS. See section 4.2 for more on the HSS and 
section 8.3 in the annexure below for more on the NHSS. 
3.1. Building RDP houses
In terms of modes of housing development, between 1995 and 2001 housing delivery 
was private developer-driven, with mass housing projects initiated, planned and built 
by private construction companies for the national and provincial governments. These 
developers were able to draw down the state subsidies through a process managed 
by conveyancers. Over 76 percent of projects were initiated and led by private sector 
developers, who controlled the process and identified beneficiaries themselves. 
The majority of housing development was undertaken in terms of the project-linked 
subsidy programme, which was the most utilised of the NHSS subsidies (although the 
individual subsidy and Discount Benefit Scheme were also popular).34 The project-
linked subsidy enabled a qualifying household to acquire ownership of a completed 
33 Section 4 of the Housing Act states that the Minister must publish a National Housing Code, 
which contains the national housing policy and, in consultation with MECs and the South 
African Local Government Association (SALGA), may contain procedural guidelines for the 
implementation of the national housing policy. The Housing Act states that any new housing 
policy applies even if it has not yet been included in a revision of the Code. Section 3(b) of the 
Housing Amendment Act 4 of 2001 makes the Code binding on the provincial and local spheres 
of government. 
34 The individual subsidy has not been used as frequently as the project linked subsidy, however 
this subsidy provides qualifying beneficiaries with access to housing subsidies to acquire 
ownership of a stand or a house, or to acquire a house-building contract which is not part of 
approved housing subsidy projects (this option is only available to beneficiaries who can access 
credit).
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house that was developed within an approved housing project (often developed by 
provincial government together with private stakeholders). Initially, developers identified 
beneficiaries themselves, however towards the end of this period beneficiaries were 
allocated to projects from a housing waiting list managed by municipalities or provinces 
(see section 4.1 below).35 
From 2001 onwards the housing delivery process shifted and became public-sector 
driven, with national and provincial government acting as developers. In 2001, the 
use of conveyancers to pay out subsidies was terminated, and an amendment to the 
Housing Act included a mandatory ‘lock-in’ period for the sale of state-subsidised 
houses. Sections 10A and 10B prohibit the owner (or the owner’s successors in title or 
creditors in law, other than creditors in respect of credit-linked subsidies) from selling 
their house within eight years of acquiring the property. This clause applies to a housing 
subsidy received in terms of any national housing programme contained in the National 
Housing Code for the construction or purchase of a dwelling or serviced site. There have 
been a number of criticisms of this clause, discussed in more detail in section 5.4.1 below 
on the informal transfer of state-subsidised houses.36 
In terms of the housing development process, after 2001 it became possible for 
payment of subsidies for completed top structures to occur before the registration of 
transfer of the property to a qualifying beneficiary.37 Before 2001, subsidy payments 
were made only once the houses had been transferred. The delinking of the subsidy 
beneficiary selection and approval processes from the actual building of a house clearly 
has a number of implications for developers, government and beneficiaries. One of 
the most notable implications of this model is that state-subsidised houses are built 
with no specific beneficiaries in mind, and actual people are allocated to a house only 
after the subsidy has been paid to the developer and the house built. According to 
a Public Service Commission monitoring and evaluation report on the DHS and the 
provincial housing departments, “of concern also is the de-linking of beneficiaries from 
the development and construction phase in order to speed up delivery. This severely 
limits the say beneficiaries have in projects,” and limits participation.38 
Another problem with the large-scale developments built since 1994 is that they were 
most often located on the periphery of existing townships on land first acquired or 
35 Shisaka Development Management Services ‘Housing Subsidy Assets: Exploring the 
Performance of Government Subsidised Housing in South Africa – Overall Analysis’ (November 
2011) p. 11.
36 Ibid pp. 77-78.
37 Important to note is that a house consists not only of a ‘top structure’, but also under- and 
above-ground services (water reticulation, sewers for sanitation, electricity, etc.) which are 
provided by different departments, timelines and, sometimes, funding streams. 
38 Public Service Commission ‘Consolidated Monitoring and Evaluation Report on the Department 
of Housing (Human Settlements): Evaluation Cycle 2009/2010’ (July 2010) pp. 11-12; 20-22.
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zoned for township development under apartheid.39 According to Sarah Charlton and 
Caroline Kihato, this has served to perpetuate the marginalisation of the poor and has 
not contributed to the “compaction, integration and restructuring of the apartheid city.”40 
3.2. Breaking New Ground 
While the fundamental policy and development principles introduced by the 1994 
White Paper on Housing continue to guide all developments in respect of housing 
policy and implementation, there has been another shift in policy focus since 2004. In 
2003, a comprehensive review was undertaken of the government’s housing delivery 
programme since 1994.41 This led to the approval of the Comprehensive Plan for the 
Creation of Sustainable Human Settlements - commonly known as Breaking New 
Ground or BNG - in 2004.  The BNG policy amendment aimed to create “sustainable 
human settlements” and to increase the quality and size of houses and provide more 
choice in housing typology and tenure etc.42 
As a part of BNG, a raft of new subsidy and funding mechanisms were initiated in order 
to try to broaden the potential housing instruments. This included a focus on the in situ 
upgrading of informal settlement, and in 2004 the Upgrading of Informal Settlements 
Programme (UISP) was published (Chapter 13 of the National Housing Code). In 2004, 
the Emergency Housing Programme (Chapter 12 of the National Housing Code) was 
also published, in response to the Constitutional Court judgment in the Grootboom case 
which established that the state had an obligation to provide temporary accommodation 
to those who had been evicted or where facing imminent eviction and who could not 
find alternative shelter with their own resources.43 BNG also cemented the process of 
moving from developer-driven housing delivery to municipal housing delivery, and 
places “substantially increased emphasis on the role of the state in determining the 
location and nature of housing as part of a plan to link the demand for and supply 
of housing.”44 The accreditation of municipalities to undertake the housing function 
was included as a key component in BNG. The aim was for successfully accredited 
municipalities to manage the full range of housing instruments within their areas of 
39 S Charlton and C Kihato ‘Reaching the Poor: An analysis of the influences on the evolution of 
South Africa’s housing programme’ in U Pillay et al (eds) Democracy and Delivery: Urban Policy 
in South Africa (2006) p. 268.
40 Ibid p. 255.
41 Tissington ‘A Resource Guide to Housing in South Africa 1994-2010’ pp. 64-70.
42 State-subsidised housing built after 2004 is commonly referred to as ‘BNG houses’. For 
an extensive overview of housing policy shifts and development since 1994, see Shisaka 
Development Management Services ‘Housing Subsidy Assets: Exploring the Performance of 
Government Subsidised Housing in South Africa – Timeline Analysis’ (April 2011).
43 Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and Others 2001 (1) SA 46 
(CC) (Grootboom). See Tissington ‘A Resource Guide to Housing in South Africa 1994-2010’ pp. 
43-44.
44 Ibid p. 13.
SERI Housing inside Final to print.indd   16 2013/07/03   10:27:22 AM
17
Section 1: Introduction Section 3: Overview of the South African Housing Context: 1995-present
jurisdiction and to take control of the demand-driven housing process envisioned in 
BNG. See section 8.2 in the annexure below for more on municipal accreditation.
The period 2004-2009 has be categorised as one focused on “delivering human 
settlements” in terms of BNG, through the building of mega-projects like N2 
Gateway (2005) in Cape Town and Cosmo City (2004) and Olievenhoutbosch (2006) in 
Johannesburg. During this period, despite the progressive policy and programme in 
place advocating for in situ upgrading, public discourse and messages from the state 
focused on the need for “slum eradication” and “slum clearance.”45 This manifested in 
several concrete ways over the years, most publicly in the attempted mass eviction of 
thousands of households from the Joe Slovo informal settlement in Cape Town (as part 
of the N2 Gateway project, one of the pilot projects of BNG), which was challenged by the 
occupiers in the Constitutional Court,46 and in the judicial challenge by the shackdwellers’ 
movement Abahlali baseMjondolo to the KwaZulu-Natal Elimination and Prevention of 
Re-emergence of Slums Act 6 of 2007 (KZN Slums Act).47 Housing-related cases are the 
most common socio-economic rights cases to be brought before the Constitutional 
Court. These cases, and those that often come before the lower courts, generally show 
up the vast gap between national policy intent on the one hand, and implementation 
on the other (most often undertaken by provinces 
or municipalities). It is clear that very few people, 
particularly government officials, are aware of the 
currently applicable policies and programmes.
Since the National Housing Code was revised 
and re-published in 2009, the key national 
housing programmes now include the Upgrading 
of Informal Settlements Programme (UISP), 
Emergency Housing Programme, Integrated 
Residential Development Programme (IRDP), 
Social Housing Programme and Community 
Residential Units (CRU) Programme. A brief overview of each of these programmes is 
provided below, with a focus on who is eligible for the programme, how beneficiaries are 
selected, allocation processes etc.
45 A recent book by Marie Huchzermeyer called Cities with ‘Slums’: From informal settlement 
eradication to a right to the city in Africa, argues that this messaging was largely caused by 
the misunderstanding between the United Nations’ Millennium Development Goal (MDG) 
to improve the lives of 100 million slumdwellers, and a target to free cities of slums i.e. the 
eradication of slums. 
46 Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v Thubelisha Homes & Others CCT [2009] ZACC 
16 (Joe Slovo). See Tissington ‘A Resource Guide to Housing in South Africa 1994-2010’ pp. 48-52.
47 Abahlali baseMjondolo Movement SA and Another v Premier of the Province of KwaZulu-Natal 
and Others [2009] ZACC 31 (Abahlali). See Tissington ‘A Resource Guide to Housing in South 
Africa 1994-2010’ pp. 52-53.
“Housing-related cases are the most 
common socio-economic rights 
cases to be brought before the 
Constitutional Court. These cases, 
and those that often come before 
the lower courts, generally show 
up the vast gap between national 
policy intent on the one hand, and 
implementation on the other...”
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3.2.1. Upgrading of Informal Settlements Programme (UISP)
The aim of the UISP is to provide improved services and security of tenure to people 
living in informal settlements. The UISP categorically states that only “as a last resort, 
in exceptional circumstances, [may] the possible relocation and resettlement of people 
on a voluntary and co-operative basis as a result of the implementation of upgrading 
projects” be considered.48 The UISP is effectively an area-based subsidy meant to be 
applied to a specific informal settlement to improve the quality of services and security 
of tenure for all who live there. 
The UISP applies to households and individuals who qualify under the NHSS criteria, 
however, importantly, it is also applies to those previously excluded from the NHSS. This 
includes households that exceed the income threshold, people without dependents, child-
headed households, etc. Furthermore, individuals who have previously received state 
housing assistance, have owned property or currently own residential property, as well as 
undocumented migrants, may be considered on a case-by-case basis. The UISP provides 
funding for the installation of both interim and permanent municipal engineering services 
i.e. the creation of serviced stands. Community participation is acknowledged as being 
important to the UISP and funding is made available to support social processes.49
3.2.2. Emergency Housing Programme 
The Emergency Housing Programme has the objective to provide temporary housing 
relief to people in urban and rural areas who find themselves in emergency situations.50 
Emergency housing assistance is provided through grants to local government, 
administered by provincial government, to enable municipalities to respond rapidly to 
emergencies through the provision of land, municipal engineering services, relocation 
assistance and/or shelter to households on a temporary basis. The programme applies 
to situations where people have become homeless as a result of a declared state of 
disaster or a situation which is not declared as a disaster but in which extraordinary 
natural circumstances cause destitution. The programme also applies to those who are 
evicted, or threatened with imminent eviction, from land, unsafe buildings or situations 
where pro-active steps ought to be taken to forestall such consequences, as well as a 
number of other situations outlined in the programme.51 The programme is applicable 
to all people affected by an emergency situation and in need of housing assistance, and 
not just those who qualify in terms of NHSS criteria.
48 DHS ‘Upgrading of Informal Settlements Programme’ Volume 4, Part 3 of the National Housing 
Code (2009) p. 9.
49 Ibid pp. 9-14.
50 DHS ‘Housing Assistance in Emergency Circumstances Programme’ Volume 4, Part 3 of the 
National Housing Code (2009) p.  9.
51 Ibid pp. 15-16.
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3.2.3. Integrated Residential Development Programme (IRDP)
The IRDP replaces the project-linked subsidy contained in the 2000 Code and provides 
for phased area-wide planning and development of integrated housing projects 
on greenfield land or in an existing township where an undeveloped parcel of land 
is utilised for development purposes. The municipality or provincial department acts 
as the developer in IRDP projects. The programme provides for the development of 
state-subsidised houses, as well as finance-linked housing (catering for households 
earning between R3 500 and R7 000 a month), social housing, and the development of 
commercial, institutional and other land uses within the project. Therefore, beneficiaries 
are those who qualify in terms of NHSS criteria, as well as those who are able to obtain 
non-residential stands in the development.
According to the IRDP, subsidy beneficiaries should be identified before the design 
and approval of the housing construction phase takes place as “it is recommended 
that beneficiaries are involved from the design and planning phases through to the 
completion of the houses.”52 However, the allocation of the stands and the submission 
of subsidy application forms only need be undertaken and finalised before the approval 
of the housing construction project phase. The developer (municipality) is responsible 
for ensuring that identified beneficiaries complete and sign the subsidy application 
form for the IRDP individual subsidy, which is submitted to the MEC accompanied 
by all documentation set out in the application form, including an agreement of sale 
concluded by the qualifying beneficiary. 
According to the IRDP, on receipt of any application the provincial department should: 
within 7 days acknowledge receipt in writing; verify the legitimacy of applicants’ ID 
numbers and ascertain whether their names or ID numbers appears on the NHSDB 
(if any of them do, the developer must be told); ascertain by means of a deeds search 
whether any immovable property is registered in the name of any applicant or their 
spouse (if this is the case then the applicant should be informed and the application 
shall be deemed to have been rejected); and if the application is procedurally correct, 
submit the application for consideration to the MEC. The MEC and/or municipal council 
is then meant to consider the application and advise the developer and/or individual of 
its decision within 21 days after acknowledgement of receipt of the application form. If 
an application is rejected, the MEC should provide reasons in writing. Once the provincial 
department has received and approved a subsidy application within three months, it 
records the name and ID number of the applicant (and their spouse plus dependants if 
applicable) on the NHSDB. The official transfer of the stands to the beneficiaries can be 
undertaken after the approval of the subsidy applications (or as soon as possible after 
the completion of the houses).53
52 DHS ‘Integrated Residential Development Programme’ p. 56.
53 Ibid pp. 58-60.
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3.2.4. Social Housing Policy
The Social Housing Act 16 of 2008 provides the legal framework for the implementation 
of the Social Housing Policy, contained in the 2009 National Housing Code. Social housing 
is defined as “a rental or co-operative housing option for low-income persons [those 
whose household income is below R7 500 per month] at a level of scale and built form 
which requires institutionalised management and which is provided by accredited social 
housing institutions or in accredited social housing projects in designated restructuring 
zones”.54 The programme provides for grant funding to establish, capacitate and capitalise 
social housing institutions (SHIs) which develop, hold and administer affordable rental 
units within identified restructuring zones. A precondition for receiving capital grants is 
that SHIs must be accredited by the Social Housing Regulatory Authority (SHRA) and 
must access their own capital contributions for social housing projects. Subsidies are 
provided to SHIs on a sliding scale based on the number of low-income households 
accommodated in specific social housing projects. 
According to the Social Housing Policy, “as a general rule social housing projects should 
avoid housing uniformly very low income individuals” and the desire is for projects to 
cater for a mix of incomes. To date, social housing has predominantly benefited those 
people with formal incomes who earn upwards of R3 500 per month (and mostly those 
at the upper end of the income spectrum R3 500-R7 500 per month). According to the 
programme, the aim is to shift from income-based eligibility testing to greater “self-
targeting”, which is based on the premise that higher income households would not 
want to stay in the poorer quality units, and that the ‘correct’ income group will gravitate 
towards social housing units. Periodic social surveys would be undertaken to establish 
the actual correlation between incomes and types of units occupied and, if out of line, 
remedial action would have to be taken. The Social Housing Policy acknowledges that the 
main weakness of the self-targeting approach is that it is vulnerable to downward-raiding 
by higher income households of units meant for lower income people, and that better 
guidelines need to be developed around self-targeting in social housing to prevent this.55 
3.2.5. Community Residential Units (CRU) Programme
The CRU programme replaces the Hostel Redevelopment Programme contained in the 
2000 Code and aims to provide rental accommodation to poor households who are 
underserved and currently accessing informal rental housing opportunities. The CRU 
programme targets households earning between R 800 and R3 500 per month who are 
not able to enter the formal private rental or social housing market.56 The programme 
is intended to redevelop or develop the following: public hostels owned by provincial 
departments and municipalities; public housing stock which cannot be transferred 
54  DHS ‘Social Housing Policy’ Volume 6, Part 3 of the National Housing Code (2009) p. 17.
55  Ibid pp. 32-33.
56  DHS ‘Community Residential Units’ Volume 6, Part 3 (2009) pp. 9-10.
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to individual ownership; publicly-owned rental stock developed after 1994; existing 
dysfunctional, abandoned or distressed buildings in inner cities or township areas that 
have been taken over by a municipality; and new public rental housing assets. Under 
this programme, housing stock must be owned by a provincial housing department or 
municipality and must remain in public ownership. Housing stock developed under CRU 
cannot be sold or transferred to individual owners and there is no pre-emptive right to 
purchase. The programme is administered by municipalities or provincial government 
who can choose to manage the housing stock in-house, or outsource the management 
to an accredited SHI, private company or municipal entity (as long as all costs related to 
the units forming part of a specific scheme can be financed within the operating budget 
for the specific housing stock). Funding is provided for the development or refurbishment 
of the properties in question through the capital costs of project development and the 
long-term capital maintenance costs, however operating costs must be sourced from 
rental incomes provided to the ‘owner’ of the housing stock. 
According to the CRU programme, the “target market” is primarily the existing residents 
of public housing stock (both those who qualify for a subsidy in terms of the NHSS 
and those who do not); people displaced as a result of informal settlement upgrading 
or evictions; new applicants, who should be qualifying beneficiaries drawn from the 
provincial or municipal housing waiting list; and, finally, “qualifying indigent groups 
would also qualify for the housing but they must be able to pay some form of rental and 
services/utilities.”57
3.3. Delivering on Outcome 8?
While policies and programmes around informal settlement upgrading, rental housing 
and the accreditation of municipalities have been in place since 2004, it is only really 
since 2009 that these have moved squarely onto the national political agenda. This is 
as a result of a number of factors, including: the increasing number of ‘service delivery 
protests’ since 2004, which very often relate to housing grievances; the establishment 
of the National Upgrading Support Programme (NUSP) in 2008 to assist municipalities 
and provinces implement upgrading programmes; the increasing accreditation of 
municipalities; the publishing of the revised National Housing Code together with a 
revised UISP and Emergency Housing Programme in 2009; and the Outcome 8 human 
settlements delivery agreement signed in April 2010 between the President and Minister 
of Human Settlements, which contains a target to “upgrade of 400 000 households in 
well-located informal settlements with access to basic services and secure tenure” by 
2014 (this represents one third of households living informal settlements). The Minister 
57  Ibid p. 12.
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has since signed memorandums of understanding (MOUs) with the nine provincial MECs 
around provincial upgrading targets in line with the 400 000 target.58 
According to the Outcome 8 agreement, “the target is a shift away from the current 
paradigm of exclusively state-provided housing for the poor. It explicitly includes 
improving livelihoods through the provision of different forms of tenure, and provides for 
alternative methods of housing delivery. It is the first large-scale programmatic response 
to incremental upgrading of informal settlements in the country.”59 The Outcome 8 
agreement states that “municipalities face the challenge of implementing UISP projects 
as part of transformation towards sustainable human settlements” and that municipal 
officials will need to be supported in incremental upgrading processes in order to 
“embrace qualitative aspects of this process including: incremental tenure within informal 
settlements; adopting livelihoods-based approaches; integrating human settlement 
planning and housing activities; and participatory planning.”60 To this end, the NUSP is 
currently assisting accredited municipalities and provinces set up informal settlement 
upgrading programmes and plan for specific upgrading projects in the next two years.
Related to this, since 2009 the accreditation of municipalities to undertake the housing 
function has been emphasised as a key government priority, with a view to locating “the 
decision-making authority and funding capacity for local development at the most local 
sphere of government.”61 The aim of accreditation is to decentralise housing functions 
(including beneficiary management, administration of national and provincial housing 
programmes, subsidy registration, financial administration etc) to those municipalities 
deemed to have sufficient capacity to take on these functions. In order to be accredited, 
municipalities must demonstrate sufficient capacity to plan, implement and maintain projects 
and programmes that are integrated within municipal integrated development plans (IDPs). 
See section 8.2 in the annexure below for which municipalities have been accredited to date.
As of 2012, however, the cracks have begun to show (quite literally in the case of many RDP 
houses built after 1995, which are falling apart).62 As mentioned above, housing delivery 
in South Africa is deeply political and there has been a concerted effort by the state to 
publicise the fact that they have delivered 3 million houses since 1994. However, the 
housing delivery statistics paint a different picture and reflect a state of some contestation. 
For example, the South African government website states that “between 1994 and June 
2010, government built over 2.7 million homes for South Africans, giving shelter to more 
58 For more on The Presidency’s Programme of Action see http://www.thepresidency.gov.za/
pebble.asp?relid=2493 
59 DHS ‘Annexure A: For Outcome 8 of the Delivery Agreements: Sustainable Human Settlements 
and Improved Quality of Household Life’ (19 September 2010) p. 14. 
60  Ibid p. 17.
61  DHS ‘Accreditation of Municipalities’ Volume 3, Part 3 of the National Housing Code (2009) p. 9.
62 A major problem in South Africa relates to the quality of houses built since 1994, and in 2012 it 
was reported that R400 million was spent by the DHS to fix badly built RDP houses. Since 2009, 
it appears that billions of rands have been spent on this remedial action i.e. fixing already built 
RDP houses as part of the national department’s rectification programme. 
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than 13 million people.”63 More recently, the DHS stated that a total of 2 586 856 houses 
have been built between 1994 and 31 January 2012.64 There are conflicting statistics 
around the exact number of houses constructed and transferred to beneficiaries.65
Indeed, there appear to be discrepancies between 
the number of subsidies approved (according to the 
DHS, over 3.8 million people have been approved 
for a subsidy), the number of houses actually built 
(DHS does not have an accurate record of this), 
and the number of houses where formal title 
has been received by the owner.66 According to 
a recent report on state-subsidised houses, only 
1.44 million state-subsidised properties have been 
built and formally registered on the Deeds Registry since 1994 (comprising 24 percent 
of all formally registered residential properties in South Africa and 51 percent of the 
total number of houses the DHS states have been built between 1994 and 2009).67 This 
means that potentially over 1.5 million housing subsidy beneficiaries who received a 
state-subsidised house have not had the house registered in the Deeds Registry and 
do not have formal title.68 From 2005, there is a consistent decrease in the number of 
state-subsidised houses registered “and this is continuing and becoming worse.”69 Many 
houses are not registered or are built on unproclaimed land where there is not even a 
township register opened.
There is also evidence that the number of housing opportunities being created by 
government is declining and that, while the DHS spends its entire budget, the achievement 
of targets is “very low”.70 In October 2012, the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on 
Human Settlements published a report which showed that in terms of the Outcome 8 
delivery agreement, only 91 558 serviced sites had been created (22.8 percent of the 
target to upgrade in situ 400 000 households living in well-located informal settlements 
with basic services and tenure security by 2014).71 According to the Portfolio Committee, 
“the slow pace of delivery in the upgrading of informal settlements” is of concern and at 
63 See http://www.info.gov.za/aboutsa/housing.htm 
64 See T Sexwale ‘Reply to Question No. 136’ (March 2012).
65 DHS ‘Annual Report 2010/2011’ (31 March 2011).
66 Shisaka ‘Housing Subsidy Assets: Overall Analysis’ p. 23.
67 Ibid.
68 Ibid.
69 Ibid. According to Shisaka, a significant contributor to this decline is the removal of the 
requirement that registration of the house is required for a subsidy payment, which occurred in 
April 2004.
70 Portfolio Committee on Human Settlements ‘Budgetary Review and Recommendation Report 
of the Portfolio Committee on Human Settlements on the Budget Vote 31 – Human Settlements 
for the  financial year end 31 March 2012’ (17 October 2012) p. 23.
71  Ibid p. 11.
“This means that, potentially, 
over 1.5 million housing subsidy 
beneficiaries who received a state 
housing asset have not had the 
house registered in the Deeds 
Registry and do not have formal 
title.”
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the current pace of delivery it will be impossible to meet the target by 2014.72 In terms 
of the provision of rental housing, only 11 334 units have been provided, which is 14.2 
percent of the total of 80 000 units to be built by 2014. 
The report also includes findings from the Financial and Fiscal Commission (FFC), which 
showed that by December 2011, the DHS had reported that the number of houses 
completed was 88 441 (for three quarters) out of a target of 220 000.73 The FFC states 
that while the annual target is 220 000 housing units built per year between 2011 and 
2014, the actual delivery of houses has in fact never reached 220 000 per year since 
2007/2008. During this latter period, housing delivery totalled 146 465 units, while in 
2010/11 housing delivery totalled 121 879 units. According to the 2011 Census, the 
current estimated need for housing is 2.3 million households.
Given the current levels of protest and alleged maladministration, fraud and corruption 
- as well as the reality of declining state-subsidised housing delivery and an ostensible 
shift towards informal settlement upgrading and the provision of subsidised rental 
housing - it is important to analyse the current policies and systems in place around 
housing demand and allocation of houses. 
The following section describes the policies and processes in place at national level, and 
in Gauteng and the Western Cape, with the aim of highlighting the complexities and 
contradictions of the different policies and systems in place. 
72  Ibid.
73  Ibid p. 22.
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This section provides three case studies of policies and systems in place around housing 
demand capture and allocation: at national level and in two provinces - Gauteng and the 
Western Cape. While not an exhaustive or in-depth investigation into all aspects of the 
housing allocation process, it provides some information on the current policies, systems 
and processes undertaken by the DHS at national level, and by the Gauteng Department 
of Local Government and Housing (GDLGH) and the Western Cape Department of 
Human Settlements (WCDHS) at provincial level. It is important to note that there is an 
overlap between national and provincial policies and systems, and that the role of local 
government in housing is increasing as municipalities receive accreditation. These issues 
are noted throughout the case studies.
The section begins with a brief overview of the housing waiting list system in South 
Africa, and the Housing Subsidy System (HSS), as these are important for housing 
allocation in South Africa. 
4.1.  Housing Waiting List System 
In the 1994 White Paper on Housing the South African government committed to 
provide housing for all its citizens. In an effort to ensure fair allocation of the limited 
housing subsidies available per year, provinces and municipalities adopted the housing 
waiting list system. During apartheid a range of housing lists were drawn up, so after 
1994 many people were already registered on one or more list, and municipalities and 
provinces attempted to merge lists and create consolidated databases of people waiting 
for houses. People were asked to register by filling in a form with details such as ID 
number, gender, age, number of dependents, etc. They were then given a receipt called 
a ‘C-form’, which took note of the date the individual had registered. The waiting list 
system was supposed to work on a ‘first come first served’ basis, i.e. when your name 
made its way to the top of the list you were allocated a house; however location also 
became a relevant factor later.74 Registering on a housing waiting list (or a demand 
database) is not the same as applying for a housing subsidy, and these two processes 
74 Interview with Margot Rubin, PhD student at the School of Architecture and Planning, University 
of the Witwatersrand (29 February 2012).
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are sometimes confused. There are numerous challenges with this system across the 
country, which are discussed in section 5.1 of this report. 
Interestingly, as a response to some of these challenges, eThekwini Metropolitan 
Municipality took a council decision to scrap the housing waiting lists, with effect from 
19 November 2002.75 Prior to 2002, however, the 
municipality was already using various other forms 
of housing allocation, including a system where 
‘expressions of interest’ in housing opportunities 
were advertised and people were asked to register 
during a specific period of time. This system was 
combined with a random selection or ‘lottery’ 
system. According to Sarah Charlton, if a housing 
project came about, people were invited to apply 
and thousands of people queued to fill in the 
necessary forms. The applications that passed 
the initial pre-screening test were then placed in a box and numbers were randomly 
pulled out. These applications were then sent to the DHS for approval, and successful 
applicants were allocated a house in the project.76
This was also done because of an acknowledgement by the municipality that existing 
housing waiting lists were racially-based, and the system perceived as unfair and 
unreliable. While accepting that random selection has been critiqued for not catering to 
a person’s geographic and social location, the municipality believes this system is a more 
equitable and efficient means of allocating houses than the chaotic, and sometimes 
politically motivated, waiting list system.77 According to the CSSR, eThekwini municipality 
now applies “a project-based register developed specifically for each project and kept 
only for the duration of that project.”78 According to the municipality, the majority of 
housing projects are now informal settlement upgrading projects and most subsidies are 
allocated to existing residents of settlements. It states that in greenfield developments 
“a portion of sites will be advertised in the local newspapers for the general public to 
access. The public will need to respond to such adverts by phoning in and making an 
appointment to fill in the relevant application forms.”79 While eThekwini municipality 
explicitly dispensed with the waiting list system, and opting early on for a form of ‘lottery’ 
system, other provinces and municipalities have continued to work with the waiting list 
75 eThekwini Metropolitan Municipality ‘How to Apply for Low-Cost Housing’: http://www.durban.
gov.za/media_publications/new2/Pages/How-to-Apply-for-Low-Cost-Housing.aspx 
76 Interview with Sarah Charlton, senior lecturer at the School of Architecture and Planning, 
University of the Witwatersrand (27 February 2012).
77 Ibid.
78 CSSR ‘The Social Consequences of Establishing ‘Mixed’ Neighbourhoods’ p. 38.
79 eThekwini Metropolitan Municipality ‘How to Apply for Low-Cost Housing’.
“During apartheid a range of 
housing lists were drawn up, so 
after 1994 many people were 
already registered on one or 
more list, and municipalities and 
provinces attempted to merge lists 
and create consolidated databases 
of people waiting for houses.”
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system in some form or other, the latest incarnation being the National Housing Needs 
Register (NHNR) and provincial demand databases. 
4.1.1. Housing waiting lists: some statistics
Of the 1.8 million households nationally with at least one member registered on the 
housing waiting list, around 25 percent live in shacks in informal settlements, 45 percent 
live in a dwelling/structure on a separate stand, 12 percent live in a traditional dwelling 
and 10 percent live in a backyard shack.80 According to Stats SA’s 2009 General Household 
Survey (GHS), 458 000 households living in shacks in informal settlements (i.e. in shacks 
not located in backyards of formal houses) in South Africa have at least one member of 
the household on a waiting list for a state-subsidised house. This comprises 38 percent 
of the total number of households living in informal settlements.81 The GHS states 
around 506 000 households living in informal settlements (42 percent of households 
in this category) appear to qualify to be on the waiting list.82 In the Western Cape and 
Gauteng, more than 50 percent of households living in informal settlements with at least 
one member on the waiting list have been on the waiting list for five or more years. The 
2009 GHS also explores whether any household members have received a government 
housing subsidy. For households living in informal settlements, a very low percentage (3 
percent) report having received a subsidy.83
In Gauteng there are 480 796 households whose main dwelling is a shack in an informal 
settlement, and 215 890 households (45 percent) living in informal settlements claim to 
be on the RDP waiting list.84 However, according to the GHS, only 186 691 households 
qualify in terms of the NHSS criteria. In contrast to the national picture, therefore, there 
are more people on the waiting list than currently seem to qualify. Of the 660 543 total 
households with at least one member on the housing waiting list, one third live in shacks 
in informal settlements, 38 percent live in a dwelling/structure on a separate stand, 15 
percent live in a backyard shack and 7 percent live in a backyard dwelling/house/room.85 
80 Housing Development Agency (HDA) ‘South Africa: Informal settlements status’ (2012) p. 47.
81 According to the 2009 GHS, at the time of the survey, 15.3 percent of South African households 
were living in an ‘RDP’ or state-subsidised dwelling while a further 13.3 percent had at least one 
household member on a demand database/waiting list for state-subsidised housing. Ibid.
82 The GHS looks at the following criteria: household income of less than R3 500 per month, a 
household size of more than one individual, no ownership of another dwelling, and no previous 
housing subsidy received. According to the HDA, “When interpreting this data it is important 
to recall the definition of households used in surveys. Households are not necessarily stable 
units nor are they necessarily comprised of individuals who would choose to live together 
if alternative accommodation was available. It is therefore plausible that some households 
may reconstitute if one current household member were to obtain a subsidised house; some 
members of the household may move into the new house while others may remain in the 
shack.” Ibid p. 48.
83 The disclaimer here is that there may be a response bias in this data; households living in 
informal settlements that have received a subsidy are unlikely to admit to this. HDA ‘South 
Africa: Informal settlements status’ (2012) pp. 47-48.
84 HDA ‘Gauteng: Informal settlements status’ (2012) p. 24.
85 Ibid.
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When asked which year the first household member joined the waiting list, 44 percent 
of people surveyed said between 2006 and 2009, 33 percent said between 2000 and 
2005, and 22 percent said between 1990 and 1999. More than 50 percent of households 
in shacks in informal settlements have been on the waiting list for five or more years .86
In the Western Cape there are 133 952 households whose main dwelling is a shack in 
an informal settlement, and 47 801 of these households (36 percent) claim to be on 
the RDP waiting list.87 According to the GHS, 56 675 households living in a shack in an 
informal settlement qualify for a state-subsidised house. When asked which year the first 
household member joined the waiting list, 45 percent of people surveyed said between 
2005 and 2009 and 54 percent said between 1990 and 2004. Therefore, more than 50 
percent of households living in informal settlements have been on the waiting list for 
five or more years.88
While these statistics are not necessarily reliable and are drawn from a three-year old 
survey, they are useful in painting a picture of the situation at national and provincial 
level regarding how many people are registered on housing waiting lists, and what kind 
of shelter arrangement they currently have.
4.2. Housing Subsidy System (HSS) and National 
Housing Subsidy Database (NHSDB)
In addition to the housing waiting lists and demand databases that have developed 
over the years, there is the Housing Subsidy System (HSS). The HSS is the operational 
system in place to keep track of housing subsidy applications and for monitoring the 
allocation of housing subsidies in terms of the national housing programmes. The HSS 
is a nationally developed and financed system which is managed by DHS and provincial 
housing departments (or accredited local government), with provinces being the 
custodians of the system and responsible for managing authorised users assigned to 
the system. It is the main operational and administrative tool through which subsidies 
are allocated in terms of the NHSS. 
The HSS allows approved users to register, edit and verify applications, as well as 
capture budgetary information for different state-subsidised housing projects. 
Provincial departments receive housing-related information from local governments 
to input into the system, which is done by provincial HSS administrators. Provincial 
departments are also responsible for housing subsidy administration on the system, 
86 Ibid pp. 24-25. 
87 HDA ‘Western Cape: Informal settlements status’ (2012) p. 26.
88 Ibid. 
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and must provide accurate information to the DHS on a regular basis.89 The HSS also 
has an online platform – the HSS Online - which serves as a “single point of entry” 
to housing subsidy-related matters for housing administrators and project managers 
across local, provincial and national government. The portal also serves as a feedback 
mechanism, by providing access to reports for provincial and municipal administrators.90 
Access to housing statistics is also provided for visitors, and these statistics are based 
on information obtained from provincial housing databases. On the basis of this system, 
national government is able to determine funds spent and the progress of projects 
which are uploaded on the database.91 
At national level there is also the National Housing Subsidy Database (NHSDB), which 
is linked to the HSS and keeps records of all subsidy applicants approved by provinces 
across the country. The purpose of the database is to prevent households from receiving 
more than one subsidy allocation, and it is used as a verification mechanism for persons 
that have already benefitted from a subsidy. Details of any person applying for a housing 
subsidy are run against the NHSDB to check this. The NHSDB includes information on all 
historical and current subsidies granted to individuals, including those that benefitted 
prior to the NHSS and the implementation of the HSS (where the data was available for 
inclusion into the national database from various sources).92 The information is recorded 
against the ID number of each individual.93 
There have been numerous problems with the HSS and the NHSDB, particularly with 
regard to the loopholes for fraud and corruption around housing allocation that exist; 
double subsidisation (also known as subsidy ‘double dipping’); delays on beneficiary 
approvals; and general functionality issues with the system (see section 5.3 below for 
more on the problems with the HSS and NHSDB). 
The following section examines the policies and systems in place at national level to 
determine housing demand and assist with allocation of state-subsidised houses.
4.3. National 
This section outlines processes undertaken by DHS to formulate guidelines around 
housing allocation in South Africa with the National Housing Allocation Strategy and 
89 T Munzhelele ‘Knowledge Management and Service Delivery: A Knowledge Management 
Model for the Housing Sector’ Thesis presented in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree 
of Master of Philosophy (Information and Knowledge Management) in the Faculty of Arts and 
Social Sciences at Stellenbosch University (March 2012) p. 13.
90 Ibid.
91 National Gazette No. 32056 (3 April 2009) Vol. 526, p. 54.
92 DHS ‘Presentation to the Portfolio Committee on Human Settlements on the administration 
systems and processes designed to control “double subsidisation”’ (10 August 2010).
93 National Gazette No. 32056 (3 April 2009) Vol. 526, p. 54.
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to establish a database to record household demand, through the National Housing 
Needs Register (NHNR). According to DHS, there has never been an official national 
housing waiting list and the institution and administration of housing waiting lists is 
not a national policy requirement. In 2006 then Minister of Housing, Lindiwe Sisulu, 
responded to reports of corruption and maladministration around housing allocation at 
the N2 Gateway housing project in Cape Town in the Western Cape by commissioning 
researchers and risk management consultants to assist the NDoH better understand 
housing need. According to a DHS official, the rationale at the time was that, while 
housing is a political problem, “the solution is an administrative one”. In 2008 and 
2009, consultants conducted a pilot programme in the City of Cape Town, where they 
administered household-level housing needs surveys to residents of the city.94 
The National Housing Demand Database (NHDD) was subsequently introduced after 
Nkonki (the consultants appointed by NDoH) created a web-based system to capture 
and organise housing needs data that was collected. This system is available online 
but only to Western Cape residents.95 Many people in the City of Cape Town signed up 
during the pilot programme, and the NDoH received approximately 150 000 forms that 
had unique numbers (this means that the ID numbers were not duplicated). However, 
the Western Cape department of housing was unhappy that the project was being 
conducted only in the City of Cape Town, and wanted the whole province to be involved. 
During this period, the City of Cape Town was governed by the Democratic Alliance (DA) 
while the Western Cape Province was governed by the African National Congress (ANC), 
heightening the politicisation of housing in the province. The methodology of the pilot 
was then changed by the NDoH and a total of approximately 250 000 people across the 
province were recorded on the NHDD. The City of Cape Town produced other lists of 
people who were not registered on the NHDD and the process became fraught as some 
information could not be verified. In total, after consolidating all lists, about 400 000 
people in need of housing were recorded on the NHDD. This was then submitted to the 
Western Cape, which believes it now has a relatively good idea of housing need in the 
province. 
The NDoH decided not to implement the NHDD further and instead opted for what 
it called the National Housing Needs Register (NHNR). It is evident that terminology 
is important in how government conceptualises housing and the state provision of 
housing. According to a DHS official, the term ‘demand’ assumes a relationship to 
‘supply’ of housing (which will always be lacking). Merely determining housing demand 
and providing a ‘supply’ of houses does not necessarily cater to housing needs i.e. 
what people actually require. Thus, in ascertaining ‘housing needs’, the rationale is that 
94 Telephone interview with Johan Minnie, senior manager at the HDA (6 March 2012); Interview 
with DHS official (10 April 2012). 
95 The NHDD is “currently in a process of information verification” according to the website: 
http://www.ndd.co.za. 
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government is better able to understand and address what people actually require 
through effective and sustainable housing programmes. Interestingly, during the pilot 
in the Western Cape, the term ‘housing needs list’ – as it was referred to – became 
politicised and was scrapped in favour of a ‘database’. The DHS has now moved back 
to speak of “housing needs”.96 According to the DHS, the NHNR is a housing needs 
register and “not a housing waiting list” and it “represents a database for planning and 
development purposes.”97
4.3.1.  National Housing Needs Register (NHNR)
The National Housing Needs Register (NHNR) developed from the process described 
above and was officially launched in 2009. According to the DHS, the NHNR is “a tool 
made available to municipalities to capture the need of their citizens for adequate 
housing...Designed and implemented to address the issue of waiting lists queue 
‘jumping’ and mal-administration in allocation of subsidies.”98 It is a web-based system 
with three phases: capture, view and review; pre-screening; and allocation. The DHS 
views the NHNR as a tool for effective planning and budgeting of human settlements 
projects. Each province has a housing budget and decisions need to be made on how to 
plan and budget for new projects in order to make the biggest impact. Municipalities also 
have to assess housing demand for the housing sector plans or housing chapters of their 
IDPs.99 The NHNR is based on household surveys that are administered by fieldworkers 
to households requiring housing assistance. Completed surveys are loaded onto the 
system by provincial housing departments. The NHNR is administered by the DHS’s own 
web developers, and is apparently relatively cheaper to operate than other systems at 
provincial level (because of in-house resources and capacity). Importantly, the NHNR is 
linked to the HSS. While it is a national system, provinces are given training on how to 
use the NHNR and are responsible for registering people and updating information on 
the NHNR. 
The aim of the NHNR is for project planners to have reliable data on housing demand 
to enable effective planning of housing projects.100 The survey includes a number of 
questions which range from basic demographic information (ID numbers, nationality, 
marriage status, age, gender and number of people living in a household) to questions 
around preferred housing type (RDP, rental, or bond housing) and the preferred location. 
The NHNR goes a step further than just collecting information on housing, and also 
96 Telephone interview with Johan Minnie, senior manager at the HDA (6 March 2012).
97  South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC) “Economic and Social Rights Unit - 9th 
Questionnaire on the Right to Housing (2011/2012)” (22 February 2013) p. 12.
98 DHS ‘Presentation to the Portfolio Committee on Human Settlements on the administration 
systems and processes designed to control “double subsidisation”’ (10 August 2010).
99  Interview with DHS official (10 April 2012).
100  Ibid.
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gathers information on a person’s access to water and sanitation, educational level and 
employment details.101 
For example, according to a DHS official, if a housing project is being planned in a 
specific area, by logging onto the NHNR project planners should ideally be able to gather 
data on how many people from the area are registered on the NHNR, and accurately 
determine what the most responsive housing project would look like (e.g. 500 people 
want rental housing, 1 000 people require BNG houses, 800 require bond housing, etc). 
The tool gives planners an idea of the housing needs of the area, so they can plan and 
budget accordingly. Those people who qualify for housing subsidies are pre-screened 
on the NHNR, and selection criteria can be used to narrow the number of beneficiaries, 
such as those with special needs or the elderly.102 Once a project is approved by the 
MEC, people are then asked to complete the Housing Subsidy Application Form and 
apply for the subsidy, through which they then move onto the HSS.103 
It appears that seven provinces (and a number of accredited municipalities within these 
provinces) are currently using the NHNR system, namely Northern Cape, North West, 
Free State, Mpumalanga, KwaZulu-Natal (the NHNR is the only official housing list in the 
province), Eastern Cape and Limpopo. Gauteng has its own demand database but is in 
talks with DHS about moving to the NHNR. Western Cape has developed the WCHDD, 
but has uploaded its information onto the NHNR. As of 2013, 261 476 questionnaires 
were captured in the Western Cape, 112 316 in Mpumalanga, 34 481 in the Eastern Cape 
and 50 830 in the Northern Cape.104
The NHNR system has been criticised for a number of reasons, outlined in section 5.2 
of this report.
4.3.2. National Housing Allocation Strategy
In 2008, the National Housing Allocation Strategy - comprising guidelines for the 
allocation of housing opportunities created through the national housing programmes 
(e.g. housing subsidies allocated in terms of the NHSS) - was adopted by the NDoH. 
The National Housing Allocation Strategy was developed as a guiding policy for the 
implementation of the NHNR, which was developed in 2008 and is described above in 
more detail. The “draft guidelines” (as they are also called) and the NHNR are meant 
to complement each other, with the NHNR providing a list of credible beneficiaries 
101  This kind of information is available from sources like Stats SA, however, the NHNR data is non-
aggregated.
102 According to a DHS official, only five IRDP projects have been undertaken, all at a national 
level – including Olievenhoutbosch and Cosmo City. Many provinces have not implemented the 
IRDP as they are used to providing one housing type in one project.
103 To register a new user on the NHNR, one must first register on the HSS Online website: http://
www.hssonline.gov.za.  The NHNR is linked to the HSS and is available at http://demand.
hssonline.gov.za.  See DHS ‘Housing Needs Register Training Guide’ (17 August 2010).
104  SAHRC “Economic and Social Rights Unit - 9th Questionnaire on the Right to Housing” p. 13.
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to be drawn from for allocation purposes. The Strategy was approved by the Minister 
of Housing in an attempt to depoliticise the housing allocation process and tackle 
some of the problems around maladministration 
and fraud occurring in the subsidy-based housing 
programmes. The Strategy provides guidelines on 
how “to facilitate fair, equitable, transparent and 
inclusive selection and housing subsidy application 
approval processes for all housing development 
projects undertaken through the IRDP and informal 
settlement upgrading projects.”105 The Strategy 
only applies to allocation in terms of IRDP and 
UISP projects. In terms of the latter, the allocation 
procedures outlined in the Strategy apply when additional stands are created in an 
upgrading project for those who have registered their needs on the NHNR, or another 
demand database.
The Strategy recommends the formation of Allocation Committees, which comprise 
at minimum two members from the Office of the City/Municipal Manager and two 
members from the provincial department of housing. Political office-bearers are not 
allowed to sit on the Allocation Committee. The Strategy introduces priority selection 
criteria for allocation, which differ across the two housing programmes. The Strategy 
states that where there is an existing database (e.g. NHNR, demand databases), the 
following selection criteria apply:
  Primary level: “first come first served” will apply, i.e. earliest date on which the 
application for housing assistance was made.
  Second level: vulnerable groups, i.e. families with children, especially women-
headed households with children.  
  Third level: indigent beneficiaries including disabled persons or beneficiaries with 
disabled family members residing with them, as well as the aged (for females this 
refers to a person of 60 years or older, and for males refers to a person of 65 years 
or older).106
The Strategy outlines the allocation policy applicable to greenfield housing developments 
undertaken in terms of the IRDP. In these developments, some housing opportunities are 
created for persons who do not satisfy the NHSS qualification criteria, e.g. those who earn 
above R3 500. These households will most probably not be registered on the NHNR so 
the Strategy recommends that “the MEC will have to invite applications through public 
105 DHS ‘Strategy for the Allocation of Housing Opportunities Created through the National 
Housing Programmes’ (2008) p. 3.
106 Ibid. pp. 10-11.
“The Strategy was approved by 
the Minister of Housing in an 
attempt to depoliticise the housing 
allocation process and tackle 
some of the problems around 
maladministration and fraud 
occurring in the subsidy-based 
housing programmes.”
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advertisements and consider the applications on a first come first served basis, and may 
apply the priority criteria where such a need exists and is regarded as feasible.”107 
Where there is no existing provincial demand database, NHNR or waiting list system for 
a specific area or region, the Strategy states that a transition process may be required 
leading up to the completion of registration of all those on the NHNR of those areas. 
According to the Strategy, in this situation and where IRDP projects are “implemented 
based on socio-economic surveys that determine the overall housing needs, the 
municipality must pursue a public open invitation process, inviting households who 
satisfy the qualification criteria to tender applications for housing subsidies linked to the 
housing products to be delivered.” Where the number of qualifying applications exceeds 
housing opportunities available, the municipality must deploy an “open and transparent 
process of allocation of the housing opportunities” which may entail a process of “first 
come first served”, or an “open lottery system” where this is not feasible.108
In terms of the selection of prospective housing subsidy beneficiaries, the Strategy 
outlines a rather convoluted 12-step process to be followed:
1 The project manager informs the secretariat of the Allocation Committee that 
houses will be ready for allocation at a given date in the future and that an 
approved list of selected prospective beneficiaries is required for publication.
2 The secretariat of the Allocation Committee, in terms of the selection criteria decided 
by the Allocation Committee, requests the manager of the NHNR to draw a list of 
prospective beneficiaries from the NHNR for submission to the committee.
3 The manager of the NHNR applies the criteria indicated in the request of the 
secretariat of the Allocation Committee, and, in line with the criteria stipulated in 
this Strategy, draws the targeted names from the NHNR.
4 The selected names are verified against the NHNR.
5 The national department informs the secretariat of the Allocation Committee of 
the results of the verification process.
6 The Allocation Committee then convenes to evaluate the selection of prospective 
subsidy applicants against the set qualification criteria and the findings of the 
verification process. 
107 DHS ‘Strategy for the Allocation of Housing Opportunities Created through the National 
Housing Programmes’ (2008) pp. 10-11. According to a Public Service Commission report, 
allocation on a “first come first served” basis is problematic and a fairer system should be 
considered, possibly one which is based on need rather than time spent on the waiting 
list. Special categories for those considered the most vulnerable (i.e. the aged, people with 
disabilities and women-headed households) are helpful in this regard, however the poverty 
measure, in and of itself, does not consider dependency ratio (size of household), length of 
time on the waiting list etc. This leads to dissatisfaction with the perceived unfair allocation 
process. See Public Service Commission ‘Consolidated Monitoring and Evaluation Report on 
the Department of Housing (Human Settlements): Evaluation Cycle 2009/2010’ (July 2010) pp. 
11-12; 20-22.
108  Ibid.
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7 The secretariat of the Allocation Committee informs the project manager of the 
approved list of prospective beneficiaries, requesting the project manager to 
gather the required, completed subsidy application forms for submission to the 
Allocation Committee for verification.
The process of subsidy application adjudication and verification then begins:
8 The project manager must publish the list of prospective beneficiaries in local 
newspapers, and also display the list at the offices of the City Manager, in the 
project location, the local post office and any other public office with the approval 
of the relevant authority.
9 The project manager must also extend written invitations to prospective 
beneficiaries on the approved list to apply for housing subsidies, and provide the 
required subsidy application forms. 
10 The project manager must ensure that all the applications are correctly completed 
and supported by the required documentation as proof. 
11 The project manager will also enter into a conditional agreement of sale with 
each beneficiary in respect of the relevant property selected. 
12 The project manager will then refer the completed subsidy application forms 
with all the required documentation back to the secretariat of the Allocation 
Committee for evaluation.109 
According to the Strategy, it is very important that the project manager facilitates the 
establishment of a community Project Steering Committee (PSC), which will “serve as the 
community interface mechanism and will facilitate communication with the community 
on all matters pertaining to the project, including the selection of prospective 
beneficiaries and the subsidy application process and approvals.”110 
 However, it is not clear how (or if) these guidelines are being followed 
by provinces and municipalities, and how allocation of houses actually 
works on the ground. 
However, it is not clear how (or if) these guidelines are being followed by provinces and 
municipalities, or how allocation of houses actually works on the ground. Also, there is 
a lack of clarity on how Allocation Committees and PSCs should function and how they 
do function in practice, and what spaces are available to individuals and communities 
to input and engage on selection criteria and allocation processes for specific housing 
projects. The influence of councillors and government officials in allocation processes 
is also unclear, although there is the perception by many communities that ‘corruption’ 
is commonplace. This issue has been discussed over the years with the department. 
For example, at a Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Human Settlements workshop 
109 DHS ‘Strategy for the Allocation of Housing Opportunities Created through the National 
Housing Programmes’ (2008), p. 15.
110  Ibid pp. 15-16. 
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held in 2009, where the DHS presented on the National Housing Allocation Strategy, 
the Committee highlighted that the composition of Allocation Committees and the 
processes for allocating housing to communities represented the foremost challenge 
for the DHS. Some members raised problems around the non-inclusion of councillors 
on the Allocation Committees and expressed the view that the structure should be 
broadly representative and inclusive of existing grassroots community structures and 
civil society. The politicisation of certain municipal offices and the problems this causes 
for fair allocation was also highlighted.111 
The DHS itself has acknowledged that there are “gaps” in the complex process of housing 
allocation outlined above, as illustrated below in two slides taken from a December 
2009 presentation by the DHS to the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Human 
Settlements. The first slide details the existing policy provisions around allocation of 
state-subsidised houses, while the second identifies the numerous gaps that exist in the 
process.
111 See DHS ‘Presentation to the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Human Settlements’ (2 
December 2009).
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On the DHS’ own version, gaps occur around the following areas: the NHNR and demand 
databases; when and how to identify beneficiaries; the screening of beneficiaries and the 
HSS; allocation criteria and second screening of beneficiaries; and ‘beneficiary education’ 
and communication.112 There are clearly substantial systemic problems throughout the 
entire housing delivery process that, even three years later, still exist. Another problem 
with the national allocation guidelines is that they do not even mention location, let 
alone as a criterion in allocation of housing opportunities. 
4.4. Gauteng
While the NHNR and national guidelines on housing allocation have been adopted by 
provinces and municipalities throughout the country (to varying degrees), the Gauteng 
Department of Local Government and Housing (GDLGH) has adopted its own demand 
database and housing allocation policy, namely the Gauteng Housing Demand Database 
(HDD) and the Gauteng Housing Demand Database and Allocation Policy. This section 
thus examines the policies and systems in place in the Gauteng province in order to 
get a better sense of current practice, and shortcomings, around housing demand and 
allocation.
4.4.1. Gauteng Housing Demand Database (HDD)
The Gauteng provincial housing department has its own housing allocation policy and 
HDD, the latter implemented in 2008 as a result of numerous problems with the waiting 
list system. In 2006, the GDLGH first investigated the implementation of a HDD. By 
linking ‘demand’ to projects, the department felt they could then factor variables of 
housing such as the availability of land into the requirements of the beneficiaries. Similar 
to the NHNR, the HDD was meant to help the province plan better for housing projects 
and ensure centralisation of housing demand data. Within the province, a team was set 
up that conceptualised what the HDD would be and how it would function. 
In essence, the HDD is a “re-engineering” of the housing waiting list system. It was 
launched with a campaign called Operation Ziveze (‘Show Yourself’), where all those 
who had registered on the waiting lists or were wanting to register for housing subsidies, 
were asked to come forward and verify their information. Only officials at the GDLGH 
Customer Support Centre (located at 37 Sauer Street in Johannesburg) and at provincial 
regional offices were able to capture data and upload it onto the HDD. A community 
awareness campaign was rolled out across Sedibeng District Municipality, Metsweding, 
West Rand, Tshwane, City of Johannesburg and Ekurhuleni. Teams from the GDLGH 
were deployed to centres in these areas to update applicants’ information.113 In order 
112  DHS ‘Presentation to the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Human Settlements: Beneficiary 
List Review Plan (Housing Register and Demand Database)’ (October 2009).
113  Sowetan ‘Demand Database needs your name’ (25 June 2008).
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to register on the HDD, people were asked to produce the following information: South 
African ID; birth certificates or ID book of financial dependents; death certificate of 
deceased spouse (if applicable); spouse’s ID (if married); marriage certificate (if married 
and bringing a partner); divorce decree (if divorced); pay slip (if working); affidavit (if not 
working); and housing C-form.114  
Similar to the NHNR, the HDD attempts to capture what people want in terms of type of 
housing, preferred locations, etc. It also ostensibly gathers data to ensure that those who 
register on the HDD are actually eligible for housing subsidies. According to the GDLGH, 
the objectives of the HDD are to:
  Obtain relevant and accurate data for housing planning purposes through 
verification and updating of applicants information;
  Formulate a comprehensive housing allocation framework that accommodates 
previously disadvantaged groups and special needs categories;
  Help prioritise beneficiaries with special needs (these beneficiaries are identified 
as the aged, disabled, families, child-headed households and destitute military 
veterans);
  Ensure that the housing allocation process is implemented across all the programmes 
of the department in a fair, standardised, equitable and transparent manner.115
Information captured on the HDD is supposed to allow provincial government to “know 
and understand how many people require houses per region and area and what is their 
status, but also what type of housing assistance do they require in terms of various 
housing typologies available.”116 According to the GDLGH, this information is also meant 
to help:
  Identify housing need both within the area of jurisdiction of each municipality and 
the province as a whole.
  Identify potential areas for housing projects and serve as a basis for launching 
housing projects in the province.
  Assist municipalities in counteracting ‘queue-jumping’ by land invaders.
  Provide information to developers and other institutions, thus serving as a basis for 
launching housing projects.117
According to a GDLGH official, there was some fear from people that they were “starting 
afresh” by registering onto the HDD; however the date of initial registration is meant 
to be recorded on the HDD, in order to capture particularly those who registered in 
1996/1997. C-forms, the receipt that was used as proof of registration on the waiting list 
114  Ibid
115  GDLGH ‘Prioritising beneficiaries with special needs’ press release (26 June 2009). 
116  GDLGH ‘Democratic Alliance (DA) claim is nothing but political grand standing’ press release (2 
August 2007). 
117  Ibid.
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system, are no longer used but people who registered in 1996 and 1997 are prioritised. 
C-forms have been replaced with new HDD computer-generated receipts. 
Between February 2008 (when the programme began) and November 2008, a total of 
245 213 people had updated their details on the HDD. In addition, 84 447 new applicants 
registered over the same period.118 These figures were released in a press statement 
by the GDLGH, which also promised that the MEC would publish the names of those 
people that had applied, per region and local area.119 The GDLGH also committed that 
the names of all approved beneficiaries per project would be published and posted in 
local newspapers and community centres and smses would be sent out to all those that 
had registered informing them about the status of their applications.120 In early 2009, the 
Operation Ziveze campaign was reinvigorated, with the GDLGH stating that through the 
HDD, “government will provide accurate and detailed records that will eventually assist 
in the allocation of houses. This will ease pressure on those who have been waiting long 
because there was no housing project in their area.” The department went on to state that:
Those who do not qualify for free low cost (RDP) housing, the demand 
database will have records of all customers in need of all types of 
housing, rental accommodation and credit linked or bonded housing. 
This means that customers not qualifying for free Reconstruction and 
Development Programme (RDP) houses for various reasons will also 
be registered on the demand database. Once the department has 
identified the housing needs of customers based on the information 
provided by the demand database, the department of housing will plan 
for the provision of housing to qualifying customers. If the housing 
need of a particular area happens to be rental, then the department will 
include rental housing when planning for that identified area.
When people registered during the campaign, many expected that they were applying 
for a subsidy and would get a house. However, Operation Ziveze was just about updating 
or adding people’s information onto the HDD. People were told they would get a house 
when a unit became available, and people in certain areas were informed of housing 
projects in their vicinity, but were not guaranteed a house. 
There are a number of problems with housing demand databases which are outlined in 
section 5.2 of this report.
118  GDLGH ‘Housing’s Ziveze campaign a resounding success’ press release (18 November 2008). 
119  Ibid.
120  Ibid.
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4.4.2. Gauteng Housing Demand Database and Allocation Policy
Prior to the Gauteng HDD being launched in 2008, the Gauteng Housing Demand 
Database and Allocation Policy was formulated in 2007 in response to the challenges and 
failures of the waiting list system. The policy was adopted in 2009, and is quite similar to 
the National Housing Allocation Strategy. In 2011, a policy review was conducted in order 
to bring the policy in line with the accreditation of municipalities, and the revised policy 
was published in June 2011. The latest policy is intended to provide a more equitable 
and regulated means of identifying beneficiaries and allocating houses in the province. 
The 2011 Gauteng HDD and Allocation Policy provides guidelines on actual allocation, 
catering to special needs, and the upgrading of informal settlements, and puts 
programmes in place for those who do not qualify for subsidies. It also provides a 
framework for institutional arrangements such as the Allocation Committees and the 
functions of national, provincial and municipal housing departments (including those in 
accredited municipalities). According to GDLGH officials, the National Housing Allocation 
Strategy lacks differentiation as it is meant to cater for all nine provinces, therefore the 
Gauteng housing department needed to develop its own policy to address the specific 
housing challenges of the province. In addition, policymakers and government officials 
must confront local politics on the ground around housing and are often ill equipped to 
do so without specific guidance from a clear policy document on allocation standards 
and processes. 
The Gauteng HDD and Allocation Policy is applicable to all housing programmes in 
the province and is meant to be implemented by both accredited and non-accredited 
municipalities in cooperation with the GDLGH and other stakeholders. The policy also 
describes the specific information to be included in the HDD. The idea is to capture this 
information in order to identify housing needs and potential areas for housing projects, 
provide housing information to communities, assist as a tool to provide accountability 
and transparency in housing allocation, and to guide allocations of different tenure 
options according to the needs of beneficiaries.121 
In terms of housing allocation, the policy states that the allocation is guided by the following:
  The IRDP, meaning that allocation takes place after properties are developed.
  All previous waiting lists shall “be discontinued and be captured on the HDD” 
(presumably this means that previous waiting lists are to be integrated into the 
single HDD). 
  A block-by-block approach shall be applicable in all urban renewal projects. 
  Applicants will be categorised according to their geographic location where a 
housing project is identified for development. 
121  GDLGH ‘Gauteng Housing Demand Database and Allocation Policy’ press release (June 2011) 
p. 14.
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  During the process of allocation, the province or accredited municipalities will 
prioritise those who applied the earliest (presumably this means those who applied 
the earliest on the waiting list).122
The policy identifies special needs categories as: the disabled, child-headed households, 
the aged, and destitute military veterans. According to the policy, each housing project 
will be required to prioritise 5 percent of the housing units to identified special needs 
categories, and a Special Needs Policy will be adopted by the GDLGH to inform the 
housing allocation in Gauteng. The policy also describes how allocation works in informal 
settlement upgrading projects undertaken in terms of the UISP, and defines a series of 
phases. During Phase 1 of the UISP, beneficiaries for serviced stands are chosen from the 
project area, i.e. the informal settlement being upgraded. During Phase 2 of the UISP, the 
HDD may be consulted to allocate housing opportunities or call for applications through 
an open invitation process.
The policy describes the institutional arrangements for the administration of the 
selection and allocation process, which largely mirrors that outlined in the National 
Housing Allocation Strategy. These are summarised as followed:
  Joint Allocation Committee: The function of the Joint Allocation Committee is 
to coordinate and execute the allocations process in the province or accredited 
municipality and to administer all selection, verification and allocation processes. 
The Committee must comprise two members of the Office of the Municipal 
Manager of a municipality, two members of the GDLGH and two other officials 
nominated by the parties to the Committee. There must be a Chairperson and 
a Deputy Chairperson. The frequency of meetings is determined by the housing 
project process, and the secretariat function is performed either by the provincial 
department or the accredited municipality.123 
  GDLGH: The provincial housing department is tasked with maintaining and 
managing the policy and processes, cooperating with municipalities in order to 
effectively implement the policy, as well as undertaking “necessary administrative 
and capacity measures to support the accredited and yet-to-be-accredited 
municipalities in order to fast-track the implementation process.”124 The department 
is tasked with managing the HDD and providing policy information to beneficiaries 
in the province. 
  Accredited Municipalities: Accredited municipalities are responsible for the same 
functions and tasks as the GDLGH, within their area of jurisdiction. 
122  Ibid p. 16.
123  Ibid pp. 20-21.
124  Ibid p. 21.
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According to the Gauteng HDD and Allocation Policy, a task team comprising officials 
from GDLGH and municipalities should be established to “coordinate the coherent 
operations of the following functionaries of the Department”, which include inter alia: 
  Beneficiary Administration Unit: This unit receives completed subsidy application 
forms from the project manager and records the applications on the HSS. They are 
then verified against the selection made and evaluated for compliance with the 
qualification criteria. The applications found to be in order are submitted to GDLGH 
for further verification, consideration and approval. The Beneficiary Administration 
Unit then informs the project manager of the approval of the subsidy applications. 
The unit is also responsible for compiling regional beneficiary lists for municipalities 
involved, specifying the area where the housing project shall take place and the 
number of beneficiaries to benefit. The unit must then inform the beneficiaries 
to attend a mandatory beneficiary education session and must compile quarterly 
reports of the status of housing demand in the GDLGH or municipality to inform the 
planning of housing projects and programmes.125 
  Beneficiary Education Unit: This unit provides detailed information to stakeholders 
on any relevant issue that relates to housing development and allocation processes.126
  Project Managers: Project managers must alert the secretariat of the Joint 
Allocation Committee of the need for the allocation and approval of subsidy 
beneficiaries prior to the implementation of the project. They then receive a list of 
selected beneficiaries from the Joint Allocation Committee and must ensure that all 
subsidy application forms are correctly completed and supported by the required 
documentation in terms of the qualification criteria.127 Project managers must publish 
the list of prospective beneficiaries and invite them to complete subsidy application 
forms. They must also conclude conditional agreements of sale with prospective 
beneficiaries subject to a “suspensive clause in relation to the approval of the subsidy 
application”. Completed application forms (with all required documentation) are 
then sent back to the secretariat of the Joint Allocation Committee, and project 
managers receive confirmation of subsidy approvals from GDLGH or the accredited 
municipality. They may then proceed with the confirmation of the subsidy approvals 
and transfer the properties to the approved beneficiaries.128
125  Ibid p. 23.
126  Ibid.
127  Ibid.
128  Ibid p. 24.
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  Information System Management Unit: This unit provides IT infrastructure and 
support, manages and maintains the HDD and synchronises the system with GDLGH 
or accredited municipalities.129
  Project Steering Committees (PSC): PSCs receive information regarding housing 
allocation processes and procedures taking place in accredited municipalities, and 
are tasked with monitoring and reporting non-compliance to building norms and 
standards by contractors and project managers. They must attend to community 
liaison activities to determine community needs in each project.130
There are a number of problems with the HDD and the Gauteng HDD and Allocation 
Policy, which are outlined in sections 5.2 and 5.4 of this report.
4.5. Western Cape 
This section outlines processes undertaken by the Western Cape Department of Human 
Settlements (WCDHS) to implement a demand database and housing allocation policy 
framework for municipalities (excluding the Level 2 accredited City of Cape Town). The 
Western Cape Housing Demand Database (WCHDD) and the Western Cape Provincial 
Framework Policy for the Selection of Housing Beneficiaries in Ownership-Based Subsidy 
Projects are discussed in more detail.
4.5.1. Western Cape Housing Demand Database (WCHDD)
The housing backlog in the Western Cape is estimated at 426 711 households. Of this 
backlog, 280 726 households (over 65 percent) are located within the City of Cape Town.131 
While the City has developed its own housing database and allocation policy; the WCDHS 
has focused its efforts on the other non-accredited municipalities in the province. 
129  Ibid.
130  Ibid p. 25.
131  WCDHS ‘Western Cape Annual Performance Plan 2011/2012’ p. 16
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City of Cape Town
City of Cape Town Housing Database 
The Greater Cape Town region historically had a housing ‘database’ which was developed 
through the integration of the various waiting lists of the former Cape municipalities. In 
1985, the housing waiting lists were captured into a spreadsheet format, and kept as both 
paper and electronic copies. In 1996, following the first local government elections, the 
Cape Town metropolitan area (comprising a number of separate municipalities) was split 
into six municipalities, with a total of 174 wards within an umbrella Metropolitan Council.132 
At this point each of the six municipalities combined their housing waiting list data into 
a set of spreadsheets. In 2001, following the second local government elections, the 
City of Cape Town Municipality was formed. In June 2006, all six regions combined their 
datasets.133 The resulting City of Cape Town database134 records the names and personal 
details of three groups of people: those who have applied for a house and are waiting, 
applicants who have been assisted by the City with a house, and those applicants whose 
applications have been cancelled for a range of reasons.135  
According to a 2008 media release by the City of Cape Town, the integrated housing 
database contains applicants’ and spouses’ personal details, ID numbers, marital status, 
current address and employment details. According to the City, “not surprisingly, because 
demand substantially exceeds supply, housing allocations are always a subject of 
emotional debate and the City administers the allocation process through its integrated 
housing database that contains the details of approximately 300 000 registered 
applicants for housing opportunities.”136 The media release stresses the difference 
between the housing database, project lists, final beneficiary lists and registration: 
  Project lists: area subsets of the housing database extracted according to predetermined 
selection criteria for a specific project. From this project list the beneficiaries are selected 
according to the national housing subsidy qualification criteria and in strict date order;
  Final beneficiary lists: generated by the provincial housing department’s subsidy section 
132 These municipalities were Cape Town/Central, Tygerberg, South Peninsula, Blaauwberg, 
Oostenberg and Helderberg – along with a Metropolitan Administration to oversee the whole 
area.
133 For more information on the registration policies and practice of municipalities in the Western 
Cape, see Tshangana ‘Allocation of subsidized housing opportunities to households in the 
Western Cape by municipalities’ (2009).
134 The City’s housing database is accessible online to check applications:  http://web1.capetown.
gov.za/web1/searchhwl/ 
135 See City of Cape Town website: http://www.capetown.gov.za/en/Housing/Pages/Housinglist.
aspx 
136 City of Cape Town ‘City’s Housing List is Easy to Access’ (19 March 2008). According to a City of 
Cape Town official, as of February 2012 there were approximately 346 000 people registered on 
the City of Cape Town’s database. Interview with City of Cape Town official (29 February 2012).
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when they approve beneficiaries for a specific housing subsidy project;
  Registration: means that the person is registered on the City’s housing database and each 
applicant has been issued with a registration number. This does not necessarily mean that they 
are on either a project list or final beneficiary list or even qualify for housing in terms of the 
national housing policy subsidy schemes.
City of Cape Town Housing Allocation Policy 
The City’s Housing Allocation Policy was initially approved in 2004137 and revised in 
2009, following amendments to the National Housing Code and the publication of the 
National Housing Allocation Strategy in 2008.138 According to the Centre for Social 
Science Research (CSSR) based at the University of Cape Town, “it seems that the 
perceived importance of the 2004 policy concerned the allocation of houses to people 
on waiting-lists, but in practice the allocation of housing continued as before, making 
little or no use of waiting-lists. Housing continued to be allocated not on the basis of 
individually-specific criteria (as recorded in a register) but rather on membership of a 
supposed ‘community’.”139 
Between 2004 and 2009, the City sought to clarify what it meant by ‘target community’ 
and “some city officials tried to move towards the more open ‘source-list’ envisaged in 
the 2004 policy”. In 2009, the City passed the new policy, partly to “reiterate the need 
to strike a balance between ‘back-yarders’, ‘overcrowders’ and the residents of informal 
settlements, as well as between people residing close to the project and people living 
further away. In particular, people who had been registered and waiting for housing for a 
long time, but live outside the immediate vicinity, could be prioritised as highly as (if not 
higher than) people who live nearby but had not been waiting for so long.”140 
The 2009 policy applies to allocation of beneficiaries in council rental housing, as well as in 
new housing developments. In terms of the latter, the policy states that the selection of 
beneficiaries will be done on a “project-specific split between residents living in informal 
settlements and applicants identified as backyard dwellers and those in overcrowded 
conditions on the City’s housing database”.141 Once the percentage split for backyard 
dwellers and those in overcrowded conditions have been determined, i.e. the percentage 
allocation that must come from the City’s housing database, the following sub-splits 
(also based on an agreed percentage) are proposed: priority for those applicants living 
in areas that are within a determined radius of the proposed development and who have 
137  For an analysis of the 2004 allocation policy, see CSSR ‘The Social Consequences of Establishing 
‘Mixed’ Neighbourhoods’ p. 9.
138  City of Cape Town ‘Housing Allocation Policy 2009’ (approved on 26 August 2009) p. 5.
139  CSSR The Social Consequences of Establishing ‘Mixed’ Neighbourhoods’ p. 10.
140  Ibid.
141  City of Cape Town ‘Housing Allocation Policy 2009’ (approved on 26 August 2009) p. 11.
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been on the housing database the longest; and applicants that fall outside the radius who 
have been on the housing database for longer than those in the above category. Special 
consideration may be given to vulnerable groups and special needs.142 
The policy states that the approved beneficiary list recommended by the PSC for a 
specific project must be made public for a reasonable time in the affected community 
for comment before submitting for approval to the province. Applicants registered on 
the City’s database may appeal their omission from selection for a project but only on 
the grounds that due process has not been followed. Such an appeal must be directed 
to the City Manager in terms of Section 62 of the Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000.143
In February 2010, the City of Cape Town published its Draft Implementation Guidelines 
to deal with the City’s needs regarding the allocation of beneficiaries in low-income 
housing developments.
In 2007, the Western Cape provincial department of local government and housing 
implemented a new strategy called Isidima: the Western Cape Sustainable Human 
Settlement Strategy (WCSHSS), which aimed to deliver sustainable and quality housing 
through the creation of human settlements. The WCSHSS contains “specific actions” 
including to “establish a comprehensive housing demand database to support long-
term demand-based planning” and to “develop a clear allocations policy for the 
Province and ensure the revision of waiting lists and allocations processes is credible 
and transparent.”144 According to the WCDHS’s 2011/2012 Annual Performance Plan, the 
department has a number of planned policy initiatives, including “a fairer allocation of 
housing opportunities.”145 The document states that the department:
will introduce a municipal database support programme that will ensure 
that proper data is collected, collated and verified. This will ensure 
that the selection of beneficiaries is based on accurate, comprehensive 
and up-to-date information, and minimise the risk of non-qualifiers 
benefiting. In addition, the department will implement a standardised, 
transparent and fairer allocation policy and process with minimum 
criteria which municipalities will need to include in the selection of 
beneficiaries.146 
142  Ibid.
143 Ibid pp. 11-12.
144 Western Cape Department of Local Government and Housing ‘Isidima: The Western Cape 
Sustainable Human Settlement Strategy’ (2007) pp. 51 and 63.
145 WCDHS ‘Western Cape Annual Performance Plan 2011/2012’ p. 13.
146 Ibid.
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The WCDHS also states that it will “develop a consumer education programme for 
municipalities to engage with communities about the selection of beneficiates for a 
project. By communicating clearly with potential beneficiaries about the number of 
people who will be accommodated and getting their buy-in to the selection process 
before beneficiaries are selected (sic).”147 Two of the key challenges faced by the province 
are the “selection process of the beneficiary process which varies from municipality to 
municipality” as well as the “inadequate coordination between the different spheres 
of government and among provincial government departments.”148 To address these 
challenges and policy priorities, the WCDHS has embarked on a focused programme, 
which is outlined in more detail below.
When the NDoH pilot project in the City of Cape Town began in 2006 (see section 4.3.1 
of this report for more on this), service providers were hired to collect information and 
to present the data in electronic format. This was presented to the NDoH as a National 
Housing Demand Database (NHDD). However, as mentioned above, the national 
department chose to use the NHNR instead. The Western Cape department of housing 
experienced some difficulties after the NHNR technical support contract lapsed, and 
decided to identify an alternative provincial database solution. The WCDHS appointed 
Pricewaterhouse Coopers (PwC) in March 2010 to assist with developing a Western Cape 
HDD (WCHDD) aligned to the City of Cape Town.149 As a result, the Housing Demand 
Database Improvement Programme (HDDIP) was implemented in April 2010, which 
was also a response to widespread dissatisfaction among communities regarding the 
integrity of waiting lists and the recognition of the need for good quality housing 
demand information for planning purposes and to run fair beneficiary selection. 
The WCHDD is located within the HDDIP, and the latter aims to improve data collection, 
management systems and practices so that beneficiaries are chosen in a fair and efficient 
manner. PwC began this process by collecting demand/needs data from the 24 non-
metropolitan municipalities in the province, and then converting this data into a format 
tailored to the NHNR. Of the 24 municipalities, 22 were using MS Excel systems, and 
the other two were using hardcover books to capture housing demand. The consultants 
were required to devise a strategy on how to improve WCHDD data collection. According 
to the WCDHS, the findings of the research point to questions around the quality and 
integrity of data and confirm inefficiencies and gaps in the following components of the 
housing demand ‘value chain’:
  poor alignment of municipal housing policies to statutory requirements;
  insufficient internal controls in data management processes and procedures;
147  Ibid p. 14.
148  Ibid p. 18.
149  Interview with WCDHS official (1 March 2012).
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  housing officials lack training on the National Housing Code, housing policy, and 
good governance;
  the majority of municipalities utilise manually-driven systems, e.g. MS Excel, and this 
uncontrolled access poses a risk to the integrity of data.150
The Western Cape MEC for Human Settlements announced that the housing allocation 
process was under review, with qualifying criteria set to become stricter, and priority 
afforded to disabled people, elderly people and households headed by women 
The result of the initial research was the decision in September 2010 to link all demand 
data to the NHNR, as functionality exists and the system is linked to sources of 
verification, e.g. Department of Home Affairs, Unemployment Insurance Fund (UIF), etc. 
The data of all 24 non-metropolitan municipalities 
was standardised into the WCHDD and uploaded 
to the NHNR. According to a WCDHS official, 
Western Cape became the first province to 
have all municipalities submit housing demand 
information to the NHNR. In July 2011, it was 
reported that “corruption and bribery stemming 
from housing allocations could become a thing 
of the past, with local data set to be aligned with 
that at national level.”151 The Western Cape MEC 
for Human Settlements announced that the housing allocation process was under 
review, with qualifying criteria set to become stricter, and priority afforded to disabled 
people, elderly people and households headed by women. The report stated that the 
linking of the 24 non-metropolitan municipalities in the Western Cape to the NHNR 
would make it very difficult for someone in a municipality to shift names around, and 
that a support strategy to train people to use the system was being implemented in 
nine pilot municipalities - George, Drakenstein, Swartland, Breede Valley, Cape Agulhas, 
Saldanha Bay, Prince Albert, Swellendam and Witzenberg - and would be rolled out to 
remaining municipalities.152 
In 2011, the City of Cape Town entered into a memorandum of understanding with the 
WCDHS around the WCHDD. PwC upgraded the WCHDD to a web-based database to 
ensure that other municipalities feed into it, and is transferring data from all municipalities 
to this centralised database online for verification of applications.153 The WCHDD is a 
‘backbone database’, which municipalities populate separately, even though they can 
150 WCDHS ‘Housing Demand Database Improvement Programme (HDDIP)’ presented to the 
National Research Task Team (23 February 2012).
151  Cape Argus ‘New system to curb housing graft’ (25 July 2011).
152  Ibid.
153  Interview with WCDHS official (1 March 2012). The WCHDD is available online: www.wchddb.
co.za 
“The Western Cape MEC for Human 
Settlements announced that the 
housing allocation process was 
under review, with qualifying criteria 
set to become stricter, and priority 
afforded to disabled people, elderly 
people and households headed by 
women.”
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only see their own information. To do so, they require access to the internet, which is 
difficult in remote areas. It was envisaged that sometime in 2012 the website would be 
live and accessible to the public, however WCDHS is developing restriction mechanisms 
and controls for the data so that it cannot be corrupted.154 Currently, municipal officials 
are being trained on data-capture into the new WCHDD, and the WCDHS is pushing 
municipalities to use this system.
The following section outlines in more detail the review of beneficiary selection and 
housing allocation processes that is currently being undertaken by the WCDHS, and 
specifically the recent publication of the Western Cape Provincial Framework Policy for 
the Selection of Housing Beneficiaries in Ownership-Based Subsidy Projects.
4.5.2. Western Cape Provincial Framework Policy for the 
Selection of Housing Beneficiaries in Ownership-Based   
Subsidy Projects
As mentioned above, in 2008 the National Housing Allocation Strategy was published 
as a guideline for provinces and municipalities around housing allocation in UISP and 
IRDP projects; however this only serves as a broad framework. In the Western Cape, 
due undoubtedly in large part to the immense political pressure facing the province, an 
intensive research process was undertaken by the WCDHS to identify various problems 
arising around housing allocation processes, and to develop rational, appropriate and 
consistent selection criteria guidelines for non-accredited municipalities in the province 
(i.e. all municipalities other than City of Cape Town). In August 2012 this process culminated 
in the adoption and publication of the Western Cape Provincial Framework Policy for the 
Selection of Housing Beneficiaries in Ownership-Based Subsidy Projects (Framework 
Policy). By 30 June 2014, the WCDHS expects all municipalities to develop municipal 
selection policies compliant with the core elements outlined in the Policy Framework, 
otherwise project applications submitted by municipalities may not be approved.155
According to a WCDHS official, a number of beneficiary selection and data management 
issues were identified in the course of the research, including: 
  the selection approach by the municipality is often not spelled out;
  some households are in “desperate need” and should be prioritised (e.g. permanently 
disabled persons);
  proximity-based selection are often dealt with in an ad hoc manner leading to 
exclusion and lack of transparency;
  gaps in registration data can undermine consistency in registration date ordering;
  “unfair discrimination” happens in some cases, e.g. selection on the basis of marital status;
154  Ibid.
155  WCDHS ‘Western Cape Provincial Framework Policy for the Selection of Housing Beneficiaries 
in Ownership-Based Subsidy Projects’ (August 2012) p. 5.
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  there is an imbalance between the selection of informal settlement dwellers and 
backyarders in housing projects, i.e. distribution of opportunities/quotas across projects;
  there are inadequate internal processes and controls for the collection and storage 
of data;
  data quality is often questionable and not able to adequately serve selection purposes 
– often there is little information on household income and structure, etc.156
According to the WCDHS, there are a number of sticking points around the development 
of selection policies.157 Some thinking by the provincial department around key 
questions was outlined in a presentation by the WCDHS to a National Research Task 
Team workshop in February 2012, and is summarised below. 
Should individuals be allowed to register in more than one municipality?
According to WCDHS, if a system is designed that does not allow people to register 
in different municipalities, people will have to decide in which municipality to register 
and when they do, they will be allocated a new date. While simple, this system could 
be perceived as “unfair, discourage job search, encourage informal transfers, and place 
the burden of being a landlord on the beneficiary.”158 On the other hand, if the system 
allows people to register in more than one municipality, then they cannot be in the 
active part of more than one municipal database and will be placed in the archive. Only 
when they have been “ordinary residents” for two continuous years in the municipality 
will they be moved into the active part of the system. They will be required to inform the 
municipality of this and provide evidence. If “ordinary residence” is proved, the individual 
or household should remain in the active part of the system and be checked once a year.
How to deal with poor registration date data? 
The issue of poor registration date data is clearly the bane of Western Cape provincial 
housing officials. The WCDHS states that before implementation of the policy or system, 
an analysis of all registration data is required. In terms of the verification of registration 
date data, this often means looking for a correlation between the age of the oldest 
member of the core household and the registration date amongst other entries in the 
database, or other methods available. If the registration date data (actual or inferred) 
is deemed adequate by the municipality, this can be used. However, if a significant 
proportion of the data is deemed inadequate and beyond improvement, the municipality 
156  WCDHS ‘Selection of beneficiaries: Some key design issues in the Western Cape’ presented by 
Paul Whelan to the National Research Task Team (23 February 2012).
157  Ibid. Other design issues identified by the WCDHS include: the legal imperative to prioritise 
households in desperate need; persistent exclusion of certain groups e.g. farm workers; 
registered households who cannot be contacted; and balancing informal settlement dwellers 
with people living in overcrowded formal conditions.
158  Ibid.
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will make use of a composite age/registration data index across ALL database entries. 
The ‘new’ registration/age data will be worked out by the following equation:
Current date – (Current age – 18) + (period registered for)
 
2
Another option is to use length of residence in the municipality after 18 years of age 
as a proxy for the ‘period registered’ for entries with neither real nor inferred dates, in 
combination with the two options outlined above. Clearly, this is a very complicated 
system of ensuring some form of equitable and fair date ordering in housing databases. 
According to a WCDHS official, achieving buy-in from local citizens is critical. According to 
the WCDHS, ideally municipalities should display all entries with registration dates and be 
able to predict when each entry will receive a housing opportunity. A local appeals process 
around registration dates should be established, which could involve a tribunal.159
What are the sources of independent individual/household level data to 
support claims by individuals and how can use of that data be facilitated?
The WCDHS is looking for other sources of disaggregated data that could be used to 
supplement existing data or gaps in data. For example, for length of residence in the 
municipality, IEC voter registration information, school reports and municipal utility bills, 
etc. could be used as verification. Sources of verification for different criteria could also 
come from the various social grants given to permanently disabled people or adult 
caregivers.
How can the exclusionary impact of town-based selection practices be managed?
The WCDHS recommends a single database for an entire municipality, with no “town-
based selection” (this refers to the selection of beneficiaries based on the town they 
live in, where the housing project is being built, as opposed to drawing beneficiaries 
from the entire municipality), but with the “optional proximity quota”. This quota should 
preferably not be used, but if it is, certain conditions apply. The quota means that a 
certain percentage (up to half) of housing opportunities may be set aside for households 
residing within a certain proximity to the project site (selected in registration date order, 
i.e. those who registered earliest get preference when it comes to selection). The proximity 
quota can only be used in the selection of beneficiaries where the municipality wishes 
to prioritise households who have “strong, provable economic and social links to the 
broader area of the project site” and will be displaced from the broader area as a result 
of the project.160 According to the WCDHS, the proximity area around the project site will 
be “designated using a circle, centred on the middle of the site with a radius between 
159  Ibid.
160  Ibid.
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0.25 and 3.2 km, depending on the town size.161 Further conditions include the following: 
the proximity quota is not to be used in projects/project components of greater than 
500 opportunities; and, in order to be part of a proximity quota, a household must be 
currently resident within the proximity area and the database must reflect this before the 
call to establish a PSC is announced.
During the course of the WCDHS’s research, information apparently came to light about 
how problematic the data is at municipal level, particularly in regard to registration 
dates. This makes drawing from the housing database in registration date order very 
difficult; however, this is the main criterion that the WCDHS wants municipalities to use 
in their selection policies. One reason for the poor data at municipal level is that the 
systems set up did not cater for allocating houses in terms of current programmes, with 
the WCDHS and municipalities having to now “retrofit” systems built for other purposes, 
e.g. allocating rental housing opportunities. 
In August 2012, the final Framework Policy was approved, in terms of which “all 
municipalities need to adopt a selection policy covering the selection of beneficiaries in 
all subsidised human settlement projects resulting in ownership where the municipality 
is involved in deliberately selecting beneficiaries.”  Further, municipal selection policies 
should “provide sufficient information to allow officials charged with selection to carry 
out their tasks in a predictable manner, without ambiguity” and should “provide sufficient 
guidance on how the role of policy making played by elected politicians is kept separate 
from policy implementation undertaken by appointed officials.”162 The Framework Policy 
covers the following types of housing projects: greenfield, non-relocation projects; 
relocation of a portion of informal settlement in the process of upgrade; and institutional 
and affordable housing projects. This report will focus on the issue of selection in the 
first category of housing project.  
According to the Framework Policy, the general core elements that should be included 
in all projects are as follows:
161  Ibid. The radius in small and very small towns is 0.25 – 1km; medium towns it is 1 -1.5km; and 
in large towns it is 1.5 – 3.2 kms.
162 WCDHS ‘Western Cape Provincial Framework Policy for the Selection of Housing Beneficiaries 
in Ownership-Based Subsidy Projects’ (August 2012) p. 5.
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  Registration date ordering as a primary criterion;163
  Promote systematic inclusion of eligible groups;164
  Avoid perverse incentives;
  Independent verification of individual or household information;165
  Use of readily measurable and verifiable indicators;166
  Balancing people in overcrowded conditions and informal settlement dwellers;167
  Length of residence in municipality a prerequisite for selection.168
 In terms of greenfield housing projects, the Framework Policy states that “municipalities 
must prioritise individuals and households in desperate need in a registration date 
ordered list.  Within the category of individuals or households in desperate need, earlier 
registration dates should be prioritised.”169 The Framework Policy also states that where 
163 According to the Framework Policy, if a municipality decides to use a points-based system, 
the majority of points should be allocated to the date of registration. The manner in which the 
date of registration is assigned to individuals or households and applied in selection should 
be consistent across all database entries where possible. Ordering by the age of adults in the 
core household is a permissible basis for selection, although when used, it must be used in 
combination with registration date ordering. The length of residence of individuals/households 
in a municipality can be used as a proxy for registration dates as a last resort, provide that 
claims made by all registering individuals/households about their length of residence are 
verified by independent means.” Ibid p. 7.  
164 For example, “municipalities should ensure the application of the policy includes households 
who are located outside of towns in which housing projects tend to be concentrated. 
Furthermore, municipalities should take account of registration practices that might have 
occurred in the past and that lead to situations in which households with young adults in the 
core tend to be selected before households with older adults in the core.” Ibid p. 8.
165 “Municipalities must verify claims made by households or individuals in the registration or 
updating process and used to select beneficiaries.  The means of verification should be objective 
and independent of beneficiaries or potential beneficiaries as well as the municipal officials 
responsible for making selections. The ‘community’ must not be used to identify possible false 
claims made by households or individuals during registration or updating.” Ibid.
166  “Selection criteria should be based on indicators that can be measured and verified accurately 
and readily.  Because income is an indicator that is difficult to verify accurately, its role in 
selection should be avoided, except to determine the eligibility of the individual or household 
for the subsidy.” Ibid.
167  “The number of people in formal overcrowded conditions and informal settlement dwellers 
receiving subsidised housing opportunities should be balanced against each other.  The 
balancing should occur over successive multi-year periods and over the portfolio of housing 
projects planned and executed in the municipality.” Ibid p. 9.  
168  “The length of residence in a municipality can only be used as a prerequisite for selection if 
claims made by all registering individuals/households in a municipality about their length of 
residence are verified by independent means. If such verification is possible and is done, the 
following conditions must pertain: an individual/household selected must have resided within 
the municipality for a continuous period directly before selection; the individual should have 
resided in the municipality for some minimum total period defined in the Selection Policy by 
the municipality, although this period may not necessarily be continuous; minimum periods of 
residence should be long enough to stop people from outside the municipality locating in the 
municipality for the express purpose of receiving a housing opportunity.” Ibid.
169  The Framework Policy defines a desperate need as “a severe need that endures over time as 
opposed to an acute episode of desperation and hardship.  Households in desperate need 
experience a desperate situation due to their lack of services and shelter than other households 
in the eligible population because of characteristics (often physical) of an individual person in 
the household or of the household collectively that endure over time.” Ibid p. 10
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there is little correlation between registration dates and the age of the individuals or 
heads of households, municipalities must ensure that the selection of beneficiaries occurs 
“in a manner that is skewed towards elderly and middle aged individuals or households 
headed by elderly or middle aged persons in a registration date ordered list.”170 
The Framework Policy outlines the institutional arrangements for municipal selection 
policies. While the municipal manager is responsible for implementing the municipal 
selection policy and accounting to the council , the Framework Policy recommends 
that, where possible, an oversight body “consisting municipal officials not involved 
in setting selection parameters or managing data and officials from appropriate 
government bodies other than the municipality should be established to check whether 
municipality’s selection policy is being applied correctly when beneficiaries are being 
selected for projects.”171 According to the Framework Policy, eligible households or their 
representatives or community groups “should not play a direct role in the selection of 
beneficiaries (but must be consulted on the determination of project-specific parameters 
where appropriate).”172 It stresses that there is a need for individual households and 
communities to make input into the selection parameters before they are finalised, and 
that the results of a particular selection, preliminary and final, should be communicated 
to affected communities. Further, municipalities must establish a system to deal with 
objections to a preliminary selection list, after the list has been pre-screened by 
themselves and the WCDHS.173  
It remains to be seen how this Policy Framework will be adopted by municipalities, and 
how selection criteria will be determined on a project basis, given the specific dynamics 
in different areas of the province. The provincial government has developed a highly 
technical framework to deal with beneficiary selection and housing allocation; however 
given the political implications of housing delivery, and the levels of dissatisfaction 
within the province, it is unclear whether this will form part of the ‘solution’ or exacerbate 
the problem further.174
170  Ibid.
171  Ibid p. 13.
172  Ibid.
173  Ibid p. 14.
174 Recently the WCDHS uploaded a step-by-step housing allocation process guide on its website 
here: http://www.westerncape.gov.za/eng/your_gov/200266/pubs/public_info/A/272351#01
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The previous sections have outlined some of the policies and systems in place around 
housing demand capture and housing allocation at the national level and in the Gauteng 
and Western Cape provinces. Much of what is set out refers to what ought to happen in 
terms of policies and processes; however it is clear that what is happening on the ground 
is often very different. This section therefore outlines a number of systemic problems 
related to the current policies and processes, including:
5.1. Problems with the ‘waiting list’ system;
5.2. Problems with demand databases;
5.3. Problems with the HSS;
5.4. Problems with allocation of houses; and 
5.5. Problems around municipal accreditation.
While these problems are discussed separately below, they are interrelated and form 
part of a bigger question around how best to match housing needs of communities, 
households and individuals with appropriate solutions in South Africa. This section relies 
on a review of secondary literature, as well as interviews with government officials. Where 
applicable, perceptions of academics, CBOs, NGOs and community members around 
housing demand and allocation in Gauteng and the Western Cape have been included.
5.1. Problems with the ‘Waiting List’ System
In Gauteng and the Western Cape (and, presumably, across the country), it is clear that 
there is no all-encompassing housing ‘waiting list’ that operates in a fair and rational 
manner to allocate houses on a ‘first come first served’ basis. Furthermore, no housing 
waiting ‘queue’ exists in the sense that it is currently understood by most people. Thus it 
is unclear what exactly is meant by ‘jumping the queue’, a phrase that is constantly used 
by government officials.
Systemic Problems 
with Policies and  
Processes
5
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Queue-jumping
The issue of ‘queue-jumping’ was raised a number of times during the Gauteng 
discussions held for this study. One participant questioned the existence of a genuine 
housing ‘queue’, given the continued “myth of the waiting list”, while another raised the 
question that, if the waiting list actually exists and if there is a functioning system, 
what is the role of litigation as a means of ‘queue-jumping’.175 The issue was raised 
of emergency accommodation being provided as a temporary solution to people, but 
becoming de facto permanent because people stay in the accommodation for years, 
without permanent options being provided. Another NGO participant highlighted the fact 
that there are different entry points into the system or so-called ‘queue’ for housing and 
that these need to be acknowledged and unpacked, bearing in mind issues of equity.176 
According to a recent report on allocation in managed land settlement projects,177 there 
are challenges with dominant public policy, and its political and ideological links:
175 In many eviction cases in South Africa, courts have referred to the “housing waiting list” or to 
the ”housing queue.” In a number of cases where the City of Johannesburg was ordered to 
provide temporary accommodation to those made homeless by an eviction, the City attempted 
to argue that these people are effectively ‘jumping the queue’, which should not be permitted. 
However the recent landmark Blue Moonlight judgment by the Constitutional Court has the 
following to say on the issue of ‘queue-jumping’ in this context: “Opportunists should not be 
enabled to gain preference over those who have been waiting for housing, patiently, according 
to legally prescribed procedures. But, as the Supreme Court of Appeal found, queue jumping 
is not in issue in this case. The Occupiers do not claim permanent housing, ahead of anyone 
else in a queue. They have to wait in the queue or join it.” The Court further stated that the 
occupiers in the PE Municipality case could also not accurately be defined as ‘queue jumpers’, 
as they were “a homeless community that had been evicted once and then found land to 
occupy with what they considered to be the owner’s permission where they had been residing 
for eight years. They did not deliberately invade land with an intention of disrupting the 
housing programme and placing themselves at the front of the queue.” City of Johannesburg 
Metropolitan Municipality v Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd and Another 2012 (2) SA 104 
(CC) paras 93-94.
176 In a discussion of eligibility and allocation in managed land settlement projects, Royston and 
Eglin differentiate between state-led and community-led allocation. They observe that for state-
driven allocation, eligibility tends to be driven by the municipal waiting list/demand database 
and generic housing subsidy criteria. Allocation to a project could be driven by qualifying for 
a subsidy, being on top of the waiting list or coming from a particular informal settlement. For 
community-driven allocation, eligibility could take into consideration whether the person is a 
member of the savings scheme, if they have saved a minimum target savings amount, if they 
live in a certain informal settlement, etc.  Allocation in the case of the latter could be based on 
savings points, attendance at community meetings, being on the list the longest, etc. Royston 
and Eglin ‘Allocation Thought Piece for Managed Land Settlement’ p. 7.
177 Managed land settlement is a form on incremental tenure upgrading advocated by organisations 
like Afesis-corplan and Urban LandMark. Under a managed land settlement initiative, the outer 
boundary of an existing informal settlement earmarked for future upgrading, or a new piece of 
land identified for phased and incremental settlement, could be identified and communities are 
afforded the right to settle on a plot and granted permission to build certain types of structures 
on it. The proponents of this incremental approach are lobbying for government support for a 
pilot and demonstration projects to explore these different tenure arrangements. See R Eglin 
‘Between a Shack and an RDP House: Alternative Forms of Tenure Security’ Transfomer 15, 5 
(October/November 2009) pp. 3-5. See also http://www.landfirst.org.za/
Systemic Problems 
with Policies and  
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if an organised community takes initiative, or wins a court case, 
then the public system is not very adept at being responsive to a 
departure from the “waiting patiently” (for your name to come up 
on a waiting list) mentality. It could be said that this mind set has 
actually disempowered people over the last fifteen years or so, as 
it has undermined some community’s ability or will power to get on 
with it themselves. In contrast, some of the social movements stand in 
contrast to this (“nothing for us without us”)…178 
In the Gauteng CBO discussion a concern was raised that backyard shackdwellers are 
not included in the province’s housing policy and, while they have “waited patiently and 
done the right thing” those who have occupied land illegally and who reside in informal 
settlements are catered for in terms of the national upgrading programme. This view was 
countered by one of the participants, who stated that backyard shackdwellers and people 
living in informal settlements are in the same predicament, and that all people are entitled 
to access housing subsidies and to be provided with housing opportunities. Another 
participant raised concerns about access to housing subsidies by inner city Johannesburg 
residents, who were seen to be left out of housing delivery and allocation processes.  
In practice, “housing subsidy beneficiaries are derived from a variety of different sources, 
not simply the waiting list or demand database. This is because in a programmatic 
development approach certain informal settlements may be identified for upgrading 
and their occupants may not be high on the list or might not be on it at all. The impetus 
for development is not always the next name on a waiting list, even although this is the 
perception that exists among people who have waited decades for their name to come 
up.”179 According to Lauren Royston and Ronald Eglin, “the notion of waiting patiently 
is also reinforced politically,”180 and this can cause problems in situations where the 
allocation system driven by a ‘first come first served’ principle comes into conflict with 
an area-specific upgrading agenda e.g. the Alexandra Renewal Project (see below in this 
section for more on this project).
During the Gauteng NGO discussion, the waiting list system was referred to as a tool 
of political and social control in housing delivery, and the criticism was levelled that 
current systems generate very specific behaviour and do not take into account growth 
and split of families, multi-nodal survival strategies, etc. One participant mentioned that 
178 Royston and Eglin ‘Allocation Thought Piece for Managed Land Settlement’ pp. 4-5.
179 Ibid p. 9.
180 Ibid.
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registering one’s name on the waiting list or demand database has become “a rite of 
passage for people when they turn 18”, however there is no sense of how long they will 
wait for a house, or what options are available to them in the interim. 
There are numerous challenges with the waiting list system that have been raised by 
government officials and others. In the early years of housing delivery it did not matter 
where a housing project was built, if your name was on top of the list, you were allocated 
a house in that project (in theory). According to a report by the CSSR, South African 
housing policy “does not leave scope for personal choice in terms of the location housing 
project. One key reason for this is that housing implementation is totally supply driven 
and potential beneficiaries can always decide to not take up a housing place and wait for 
the project, but the queuing system does not always leave scope for this.”181 Therefore, 
housing allocation did not take into the account the social and economic links which 
beneficiaries had to their areas of previous residence.182 This problem was eventually 
addressed by making location a factor in the housing allocation process. However area-
based or in situ housing projects had the effect of rendering the waiting list system 
ineffective, as these projects used different criteria altogether.183 Furthermore, waiting 
lists did not take into account people with ‘special needs’, placing them within the same 
registration-date-based list as everyone else. The waiting list system also depended on 
reliable, updated information; however, this data was not obtained or maintained by 
181 CSSR ‘The Social Consequences of Establishing ‘Mixed’ Neighbourhoods’ p. 27
182 According to research undertaken by Marie Huchzermeyer, housing interventions (specifically 
project-linked subsidies) have “undermined community initiatives, spurred inequalities and 
promoted the pursuit of individualistic rather than community driven objectives.” Her case 
studies identify “two important tensions which may arise as a result of the implementation 
of differential housing projects. There is an explicit tension between the individual-focused 
housing policy and the tendency of communities, especially vulnerable and poor communities, 
to function as a collective, relying on committees and civic organisation structures to satisfy 
their goals. Thus, while established communities have the potential to apply the strength of 
their social bond in the fight for housing, they may not all be rewarded equally for their efforts. 
This may give rise to a second tension – individuals may well work as a collective to secure 
housing access, but they also hold ideals which align with an individualised model of suburb 
life.” Ibid p. 34. 
183 In his research on participation in the Alexandra Renewal Project (ARP) in Johannesburg, 
Luke Sinwell describes how in April 2006 the ARP shifted away from the use of waiting lists to 
allocate housing in its upgrading project at Alexandra township in Johannesburg. The waiting 
list approach to allocation, which had been used since the beginning of the ARP in 2001, was 
scrapped in favour of an exclusive block-by-block approach. This change in policy resulted from 
pressure by the Alexandra Development Forum (ADF), as well as the perceived failure of the 
waiting list approach to show any sign of de-densification or improvement in Alexandra as a 
whole. Sinwell describes how the ARP called the waiting list the “pop-corn approach” because 
as soon as people were moved out of densely populated areas in backyards, others occupied 
the vacant area and it was impossible to regulate and prevent ‘re-densification’. However, 
according to Sinwell, the block-by-block approach “has serious implications for local politics in 
Alexandra” and “reprioritised limited resources from one poor group to another...The housing 
waiting list approach meant that it would be primarily old residents who were on the waiting 
list who would benefit, but the block by block approach changed this completely by benefiting 
primarily shack dwellers and excluding and frustrating those who had been on the waiting 
list.” L Sinwell ‘The Alexandra Development Forum (ADF): the tyranny of invited participatory 
spaces?’ Transformation 74 (2010) pp. 38-39. See also Royston and Eglin ‘Allocation Thought 
Piece for Managed Land Settlement’ p. 9.
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municipalities (for example, according to a City of Cape Town official one of their biggest 
struggles is to contact people who have been selected for a housing opportunity, as 
contact details are not up-to-date). Finally, in some areas, numerous waiting lists would 
be drawn up by different groups with competing political agendas. As mentioned above, 
due to these problems and others, eThekwini Metropolitan Municipality took a decision 
in 2002 to scrap the housing waiting lists and moved to a project-based approach using 
random selection.
The existence of people who registered on waiting lists in 1996/1997, but who have 
still not received state-subsidised houses, needs to be more systematically addressed 
and it is unclear if the new systems developed by Gauteng and Western Cape housing 
departments are going to be able to deal with this contentious and emotive issue, 
particularly in line with a focus on informal 
settlement upgrading and geographic targeting. 
Perceptions of corruption are fed by the fact that 
waiting lists have not been ‘made public’, that 
allocation processes are not transparent, and that 
many people have been on ‘the list’ for years (and 
in some cases, decades). Hence the numerous 
protests, occupation of unfinished houses and 
court cases witnessed over the years. There needs to be a deeper appreciation by 
government of these realities on the ground, and an acknowledgment of the unhelpful 
myths it has created around housing delivery. This is clearly something politicians do not 
want to tackle head on, as it has the potential to foster distrust, resentment and anger.
The challenges with the waiting list system - which include administrative difficulties, 
maladministration and fraud - have been acknowledged by government in the past.  
According to the GDLGH in 2009:
The waiting list has not been a very effective tool to address housing 
challenges in the province... The investigations conducted by the 
Gauteng Department of Housing revealed that various irregularities 
have taken place during the allocation process and the occupation 
of RDP houses. This was precipitated by maladministration, fraud 
and corruption that contributed to the displacement of innocent 
beneficiaries.184 
Audits conducted in Gauteng revealed that the waiting lists included deceased individuals, 
a lack of residential addresses, invalid ID numbers and general other misinformation.185 
184 GDLGH ‘Building sustainable communities’ press release (15 July 2009). 
185 GDLGH ‘An appeal to update your details on demand database’ press release (27 May 2009).
“The existence of people registered 
on waiting lists in 1996/1997 who 
have still not received houses 
needs to be more systematically 
addressed...”
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Furthermore, there was a lack of transparency with lists, and conflicts with area- or 
location-based projects. According to a GDLGH official, it was found that municipalities 
worked offline and demand/needs data would then be sent to the province to upload to 
the HSS. Loopholes were created during this process, which led to fraud and corruption. 
Further, according to the provincial department, during an audit of the waiting list a few 
years prior, “it was discovered that 50 percent of beneficiaries’ ID numbers were invalid, 
while 65 percent did not match the applicants’ records. It was further found that some 
residential addresses are blank and deceased applicants still appear on the list.”186 
Overall, it was found that municipalities in Gauteng did not have the capacity to 
effectively manage and verify data on the waiting lists. Thus the waiting list system 
presented numerous administrative challenges, compounded by the politics around 
housing allocation, fraud and corruption. These sentiments have been echoed across 
provinces using the waiting list system, hence the move to demand databases. However 
this system also has its challenges, which are discussed in the following section.
5.2. Problems with Demand Databases
As mentioned above, to get around the myriad problems with the waiting list system, 
Gauteng and the Western Cape provinces introduced centralised demand databases to 
capture housing demand and assist with the allocation process. The national department 
also developed the NHNR, which is used by the other provinces and accredited 
municipalities, and is linked to the HSS. However, there are a number of broader 
problems with housing delivery which affect the efficacy of these systems. Further, there 
is a lot of distrust, scepticism and confusion around the databases from community 
and CBO members. In Gauteng, the fact that at registration on the HDD, “C-forms were 
confiscated” and people were given a database receipt and told that this supersedes all 
previous applications, concerned people. Prior to the HDD, people were told to go to the 
municipal offices, however now all information is collected at regional provincial offices, 
and the waiting lists are controlled by the province. 
In the Gauteng NGO discussion, a number of people raised the fact that the HDD is really 
just a glorified waiting list, with one participant referring to it as the “waiting list rebranded”. 
One participant expressed her concern that there is no sense of how the HDD links with 
housing chapters in IDPs (if at all), and if there is a way for people to be given more 
information on how long they would wait for a project in their area, or to be allocated 
a house elsewhere. Another problems is that in Gauteng and the Western Cape the 
demand databases are not linked directly to the HSS, and really should be (in other 
provinces the HSS and the NHNR are linked). In the Western Cape, some discussion 
186 GDLGH ‘A call to update your details on Demand Database’ press release (21 May 2009). 
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participants expressed the fear that the “so-called database” may be used as evidence in 
court to evict people by claiming that people are ‘queue-jumping’. 
According to GDLGH officials, some of the challenges that the provincial department 
currently experiences around housing delivery include: fulfilling promises made by 
politicians and political agendas in a context of limited resources (e.g. existing housing 
projects often suffer as new projects need to be created in order to fulfil political ends); 
as well as tensions between national, provincial and local government. The provision of 
housing is a long term programme, and often cuts across a Minister of Housing and MEC’s 
terms of office. However, changing leadership often results in a change in the goals and 
aims of the DHS or provincial housing department, which makes planning for housing 
projects extremely difficult and frustrating. According to the GDLGH, the HDD is a typical 
example of this. While the previous Minister was very focused on developing equitable 
allocation strategies, policies and plans in response to the waiting lists, these are not the 
aims of the current Minister. The HDD has thus become somewhat stagnant in its progress.
While demand databases and allocation policies exist at national and provincial level, it 
is at municipal level that policies are implemented. During our research we encountered 
a number of problems facing municipalities on the ground. One challenge raised is the 
lack of information available to communities around policy shifts and developments, 
and the effects of these. Many people believe that the waiting lists still exist, and put 
faith in them. However in Gauteng, for example, the housing policy focus has ostensibly 
shifted away from this system (and greenfield developments) towards location-based 
allocation and in situ informal settlement upgrading. While this shift was intended to 
benefit people so that they would no longer have to wait for their name to move to 
the ‘top of the list’, it may cause tension with those people who have been waiting for 
housing for many years, but who do not live in an informal settlement, or area targeted 
for development. 
In reality, the Gauteng HDD has not been fully implemented and interim arrangements 
are in place pending a decision to move to the NHNR. There appears to be a state 
of limbo at the provincial department. The HDD is only to be used for allocation to 
greenfield housing projects in Gauteng, whereas the reality is that in the province a 
large percentage (one official put the figure at 80 to 90 percent) of housing projects are 
in situ upgrading (in theory) and there is no need to find beneficiaries via the HDD.187 
According to provincial housing officials, the HDD is not really being used at all (at least 
not in the first instance) to allocate housing. Informal settlement upgrading projects do 
not use the HDD as people are identified by existing stands in a settlement. However 
there have been cases where a mixed approach has been applied such as in the Lufereng 
in situ upgrade, where some beneficiaries who had been waiting since 1996/1997 were 
taken from the HDD. Generally what happens in in situ upgrading projects is that project 
managers check the lists they get from communities against the HDD, highlighting the 
1996/1997 applicants that can be found on the system. Once subsidies are approved on 
187 Interview with GDLGH official (12 April 2012).
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the HSS, the beneficiary is given a reference number. However, the province does not like 
giving people printouts because there is confusion that the reference number equates to 
a house or stand number, which it does not.188 
In Gauteng there are clear tensions between the province and municipalities in relation 
to the HDD. The HDD is a web-based application and some municipalities do not have 
the necessary resources and capacity to implement the system. Before, in Tshwane 
Metropolitan Municipality it was possible for people to register on the waiting list at one 
of seven municipal housing satellite offices. With the shift to the HDD, people now have 
to travel long distances to the provincial office to register on the HDD.189 The financial 
and time costs of travelling to the provincial offices may deter people from updating 
their information on the HDD. Municipal satellite offices have also been closed in the 
City of Johannesburg and Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality.190 
There are also clearly many problems with the NHNR. Currently, the NHNR appears to 
collect a lot more data than is deemed necessary by municipalities, and the question 
needs to be asked how best to effectively determine individual and household needs 
and ‘housing demand’ at the local level, and if centralised systems like the NHNR are 
missing the mark completely. Secondary research has shown that municipalities using 
the NHNR struggle with the system. According to Pixley ka Seme District Municipality, 
while the NHNR is operational, “there are too many changes and [it is] not properly 
communicated.”191  In 2012, the district municipality reported that it “had since 
approached the Provincial and Regional offices of the Department to allow it to use 
their offices for capturing data on the needs register. There were a number of challenges 
associated with the needs register unavailability of reports and there was little help 
forthcoming from the provincial Department and the National Department. The filling 
of forms was still being done at local municipalities due to lack of funding.”192 It appears 
that the consultants who used to work on this system were dismissed and there is no 
capacity at national level to assist municipalities use the NHNR.193 According to Frances 
Baard District Municipality, it has been working on the NHNR since 2009 and while it is 
operational, challenges exist and “information was difficult to retrieve from the costly 
system”.194 The district municipality also stated that there is a lack of support for the 
system, all the information cannot be retrieved, and it is costly to run.195
188 Interview with GDLGH official (12 April 2012).
189 Ibid.
190 Telephone interview with Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality housing official (6 March 2012); 
Interview with GDLGH official (12 April 2012).
191 Pixley ka Seme District Municipality ‘Presentation on Municipal Accreditation Progress’ (8 June 2011).
192 Pixley Ka Seme District Municipality ‘Presentation on Municipal Accreditation’ (13 June 2012).
193 Pixley ka Seme District Municipality ‘Presentation on Municipal Accreditation Progress’ (8 June 2011).
194 Frances Baard District Municipality ‘Presentation on Municipal Accreditation Programme’ (23 
May 2012). 
195 Ibid. 
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5.3. Problems with the HSS and NHSDB
The HSS has also posed a number of problems over the years, and has been the site of 
a substantial amount of maladministration and fraud, which is discussed in section 5.4.2 
below. In addition, there are clearly more systemic problems with the HSS that were 
raised by a number of government officials during the course of our research. According 
to a local government official, the HSS is “slow and inefficient”, and municipalities 
sometimes wait up to three months for approvals.196  
Our research has shown that other municipalities across the country struggle with the 
HSS. According to Pixley Ka Seme District Municipality (which has recently received Level 
2 accreditation), it has had access to the HSS Online since 2006, but “the system has just 
been a major disappointment since inception” and operates at “a snail’s pace.”197 More 
recently the district municipality reported to the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee 
on Human Settlements that the HSS is not reliable or user-friendly, and that the HSS 
line for the district municipality was problematic.198 As a result of these challenges the 
municipality “approached both the Regional and Provincial offices of the Department 
to allow us to do the capturing on their system in their offices, to try and catch up 
on our backlogs and we are now making use of the Regional Office.”199 According to 
Frances Baard District Municipality (which also recently received Level 2 accreditation), 
it has been working on the HSS Online since 2008 (and the HSS since February 2012), 
but experiences problems with the system as the connection is “not stable”.200 In May 
2012 it reported to the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Human Settlements that 
problems are still experienced with the system, and these have never been fully resolved.
In the Gauteng province, the GDLGH has a subsidy department that deals with the 
HSS, and housing subsidy applications are sent to the subsidy department by project 
managers to be checked. Provincial housing officials run the applications through the 
HSS, where they are either approved or rejected. This information is then handed back 
to project managers, who use the approved application forms to conduct housing 
allocation based on the selection criteria. Ideally, any rejected applications should be 
handed back to applicants with the reasons for rejection provided; however a major 
problem is encountered at this point. There is no clarity on what happens in the case of 
rejected applications or what recourse people have if they are denied at this point in the 
process. A further problem concerns approved subsidy applications. Approved subsidy 
applications are marked as “Approved” on the HSS/NHSDB, prior a house actually being 
196 Telephone interview with Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality housing official (5 March 2012).
197 Pixley ka Seme District Municipality ‘Presentation on Municipal Accreditation Progress’ (8 June 
2011).
198 Pixley Ka Seme District Municipality ‘Presentation on Municipal Accreditation’ (13 June 2012).
199 Ibid.
200 Frances Baard District Municipality ‘Presentation on Municipal Accreditation Programme’ (23 
May 2012).
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built and transferred. This means that people can be classified as “Approved” on the HSS 
but may have not actually received a house. Research conducted by Shisaka, comparing 
a data set from the NHSDB to that against data in the Deeds Registry, has corroborated 
that this serious problem exists.201 
What should happen is that a prospective beneficiary is approved for a subsidy and then 
allocated a house. The beneficiary then signs an Occupation Certificate and/or a “Happy 
Letter” (a certificate certifying that the qualifying beneficiary is satisfied with the property), 
moves in and at some point in the future receives a title deed for the house. Those who 
are approved for a subsidy, but do not receive it are, ideally, carried over to the second 
phase of the project (if more houses are to be built). In this case, they should be considered 
first in line to receive a subsidy and be allocated a house. However, according to a DHS 
official, if a person moves or if there is no second phase of a project, the onus is on the 
individual applicant (not the project manager) to cancel the subsidy application and state 
that, despite approval, no subsidy was actually allocated to the individual.202 This often 
requires an affidavit stating that one did not benefit from the subsidy, which is presumably 
submitted to the provincial department. In practice, when applicants see that they have 
been approved and have a reference number, they assume that they have been allocated 
a house, which is not necessarily the case. Further, approved beneficiaries who have not 
actually benefitted have created a backlog of people who should be prioritised. Due to this 
sizeable backlog, there are attempts to investigate a 
way to archive applicants on the system so that they 
are separated from actual beneficiaries, and can 
be considered as potential beneficiaries in future 
housing projects.203 
The situation of people being approved for 
subsidies on the NHSDB but not having received 
a subsidy or house is worrying, given that they 
remain approved on the HSS. The fact that people must themselves cancel their subsidy 
application and submit an affidavit to the provincial department to have their status 
changed is even more worrying. Clarity on this issue is urgently required, as is better 
communication to the public on how the HSS operates and links with demand databases, 
the NHNR and housing allocation more generally
201 According to Shisaka, the data set from the NHSDB was problematic in other ways. For example, 
it only provided the names of approved beneficiaries (which, as mentioned above, does not 
mean these people actually received a house); it did not contain the dates when the subsidy 
was approved; and there was no database of actual state-subsidised houses built. Further, only 
ID numbers were provided and the list did not indicate what type of subsidy the beneficiary was 
approved for, or if a house was received, where is it located. Shisaka ‘Housing Subsidy Assets: 
Overall Analysis’ pp. 79-80.
202 Interview with GDLGH official (27 March 2012).
203 Interview with GDLGH official (12 April 2012).
“The situation of people being 
approved for subsidies on the 
NHSDB but not having received a 
subsidy or house is worrying, given 
that they remain approved on the 
HSS.”
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In terms of abuse of the HSS, in April 2011 then MMC for Housing in the City of 
Johannesburg, Ruby Mathang, issued a statement warning residents of fraudsters who 
collect money from people applying for houses with a promise of helping them ‘jump the 
queue’ and get to the top of the housing waiting list. He stated that “applicants are offered 
assistance with application [for] a Housing Subsidy Scheme and upon approval are misled 
into believing that the reference number is an allocation to a specific house.”204 A City of 
Johannesburg spokesperson further stated that “the housing database lies in the hands of 
the provincial department of local government and housing, not of the City. No-one has 
the power to change names on the housing list.”205 The City’s press statement outlined the 
“process of applying for a government subsidised house” as follows: 
  The applicant applies for a project linked to the subsidy through the Housing Subsidy 
Scheme, which is administered by the national Department of Human Settlements.
  The applicant is given a reference number, which is reflected on a demand database 
receipt.
  On meeting the criteria, the applicant is then entered into the demand database 
for approval.
  When the housing project construction begins, the successful beneficiaries from the 
targeted project area are formally informed.
  The applicant will thereafter be allocated a house by a housing official only.206
This ‘explanation’ of the process is not particularly helpful, as it does not address the 
different ways in which the process breaks down at various stages, from registering on 
the demand database and how information is captured, to the assumption that this 
information is actually used in housing allocation, to the problematic way in which 
housing allocation happens on the ground. 
204 K Mabotja ‘City warns of housing fraud’ Joburg News (15 April 2011).
205 Ibid.
206 Ibid.
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5.4. Problems with Allocation of Houses 
A major source of frustration expressed by community and CBO members in both 
Gauteng and in the Western Cape is the lack of information available to communities 
around housing delivery, and the lack of transparency in the housing allocation 
process. Throughout the CBO discussions, people stated that they do not have enough 
education about their rights, housing policy in general, and processes/systems of 
allocation.207 While they are aware that policies have changed, they are unaware of what 
these changes mean and how they affect communities and individuals. In the Gauteng 
discussion, a view was expressed that the policies were all in place; however for effective 
implementation to take place, people need to be aware and educated. As one participant 
stated, “government’s policies are like a beautiful lady with no one to propose [to her]. 
What a waste.” 
There is clearly a critical lack of transparency in housing allocation processes, and a need 
to unpack what this lack of transparency means and where along the extremely complex 
housing allocation process more transparency 
can be injected. There is also a general lack of 
communication and information-sharing around 
policies and processes, from the municipality 
and/or province to communities. This lack of 
communication of policies and lack of transparency 
in the housing allocation process often results in 
communities alleging corruption.208 
The problem of poor monitoring and no 
transparency in the housing allocation process 
was raised in all the focus group discussions, with one civil society participant posing the 
question: exactly how transparent can the process be made? He stated that “the system 
as it stands is opaque, you have no idea what is happening inside or what is going 
207 In August 2010, the Soweto Forum (a community-based organisation working on housing 
issues in Soweto who was present at the CBO discussion) with the assistance of the South 
African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC) submitted an access to information request to 
the GDLGH for information on the allocation lists for RDP houses in the Soweto area from 
2000 to 2010; database information from 1996 to 2002 reflecting priority allocations for 
Soweto, housing allocation policies and implementation plans for the Soweto region and 
for the province as a whole; and records detailing information-sharing processes followed in 
relation to informing Soweto communities about subsidy amounts, availability and allocation. 
In November 2010, GDLGH responded stating that its response was based on sections 34(1) 
and 38 of the Promotion of Access to Information Act 2 of 2000 (PAIA) which state that a 
public body may refuse a request if the disclosure would reveal personal information about a 
third party or if the disclosure could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical 
safety of an individual. The letter states that “it is our response…that the record of information 
you are requesting contains personal information about housing subsidy beneficiaries, and its 
disclosure might put the lives of the listed beneficiaries at risk.” GDLGH ‘Response to request in 
terms of Promotion of Access to Information Act 2 of 2000 (PAIA)’ copy of letter with the author 
(16 November 2010).
208 S Phaliso ‘Claims of illegal RDP sales in Mandela Park’ West Cape News (9 September 2012).
“There is clearly a critical lack 
of transparency in housing 
allocation processes, and a 
need to unpack what this lack of 
transparency means and where 
along the extremely complex 
housing allocation process more 
transparency can be injected.”
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to come out the other end. It is unpredictable and disempowering.” This question on 
transparency resonated with the group, and it is clear that more thinking is required on 
the issue of how transparent the process can be made, particularly around what selection 
criteria are used for specific projects, what exactly is the system used for allocation in 
practice, who is involved in this process, etc. Recognising that there are not enough 
houses being built (indeed, the lack of supply was raised as the ‘elephant in room’ on a 
number of occasions), community participants accepted that there had to be some sort 
of selection criteria to determine who has first access to housing. 
Participants in the Gauteng discussion said that there should ideally be an agreement 
between communities and the state to identify suitable beneficiaries. One participant 
raised the fact that the N2 Gateway housing project in Cape Town attempted to 
register everybody, but there was still contestation in the project, particularly around 
allocation processes. It was understood that when people register on the waiting list or 
demand database, it should start development in the area. If a housing project is being 
developed, community organisations are asked to take on the responsibility to ensure 
that an existing settlement does not grow. Generally, settlement growth occurs during 
the planning and building phase, resulting in local re-negotiations in the allocation 
process. Even if no official waiting list exists, a participant argued that there is almost 
always a community list, and the community knows who “must receive houses”. There 
was quite a bit of consensus that local negotiations will always be present in housing 
allocations, and one example given was the Cato Manor housing project in eThekwini, 
where there was an acceptance of community challenges and the need for long-term 
engagement. 
A rarely articulated but relevant issue is that there are in practice two phases of housing 
allocation which determine who ends up occupying a subsidised house. The first is the 
formal allocation phase during which ownership 
is transferred from the state to the individual or 
household. Most of this report has been concerned 
with the confusion relating to this phase and the 
roles of the state as the main allocating agent, 
theoretically governed by extensive regulations. 
The second phase, however, is what happens once 
the house has been transferred to the beneficiary. 
As the next section describes, these owners often pass on the houses quite quickly, 
even though they are by law not allowed to sell them within the first eight years of 
occupation (see section 3.1 of this report above). The main allocating actor in this phase 
is the private individual, not the state. The logic of the market (selling or renting to the 
highest bidder) makes it unlikely that the ‘buyers’ would be among the most needy to 
whom subsidised houses should be allocated. Community perceptions of corruption in 
allocation and anger about inappropriate individuals (including professionals or foreign 
nationals, for example) occupying subsidised houses may therefore often relate to this 
“A rarely articulated but relevant 
issue is that there are in practice 
two phases of housing allocation 
which determine who ends up 
occupying a subsidised house.”
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second ‘phase’ of allocation, which is hardly regulated or monitored. There is also clearly 
a lot of grey area between the two phases of allocation.
5.4.1.  Informal Housing Transfers and Sales
Recent studies have confirmed the fact that many beneficiaries of RDP houses no longer 
reside in them, and have either rented or sold them informally. While the formal sale 
of registered state-subsidised houses is “extremely low” (due to the sales restriction 
contained in the Housing Act), comprising 90 858 houses between 1994 and 2009, 
informal transfers are commonplace.209 Research shows that people have “substantial 
fear and anxiety” around the selling these houses, perceiving this to be illegal, and resort 
to informal transactions even though there is an acknowledgment that this is high risk 
for both buyer and seller.210 The main reason people sell their house is a change in 
living circumstances or to access employment.211 According to the 2008 Western Cape 
Occupancy Study, commissioned by the Western Cape Department of Human Settlements 
(WCDHS), which surveyed nearly 3 000 households in subsidised houses built after 2002, 
28 percent of houses surveyed were not occupied by the original owner.212 The study 
found that in 57 percent of these cases the occupants knew the owner and indicated that 
they were living elsewhere, in 31 percent of cases the registered owner was deceased, 
and in 12 percent of cases the occupants indicated that they did not know the registered 
owner.213 The study further revealed that of those people who said they had bought the 
house from the original owner (20 percent of the 
total cases sampled), the majority appear to have 
done so through informal sales, e.g. through an 
affidavit or contract with the owner as opposed to 
official registration at the Deeds Office.214 
According to research conducted by Urban 
LandMark in 2010, since 2005 approximately 11 
percent of all RDP houses were unofficially traded 
by their owners who were barred from selling their houses due to the mandatory lock-in 
period of 8 years. Over half of these were transactions for between R5 750 and R17 000, 
i.e. well under what a serviced house should trade at on an open and competitive 
market.215  In 2010 the Minister of Human Settlements, Tokyo Sexwale, stated that, based 
on a random sample consisting of 10 percent of housing units completed between 1994 
209  Shisaka ‘Housing Subsidy Assets: Overall Analysis’ p. 34.
210  Ibid.
211  Ibid.
212  Western Cape Department of Local Government and Housing, ‘Western Cape Occupancy Study 
2008’ (February 2009) p. 13.
213 Ibid p. 16.
214 Ibid p. 94.
215 According to Kecia Rust, “‘[The black market] is an indication of failure on the part of the 
delivery system - they’re either targeting the wrong people or building houses in the wrong 
areas.” L Wessels ‘Black market highlights RDP cracks’ Fin24 (31 March 2010).
“Recent studies have confirmed the 
fact that many beneficiaries of RDP 
houses no longer reside in them, 
and have either rented or sold them 
informally.”
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and 2008, 34 percent of the original beneficiaries are still occupying houses allocated to 
them.216 This implies that over 60 percent of beneficiary households sampled were not 
living in the house they had been allocated.   
There have been attempts by government to ‘crack down’ on those who rent out their state-
subsidised houses and/or use them to generate income e.g. convert them to spaza shops. 
In a response to a 2010 incident in which a provincial MEC threatened to evict an owner of a 
RDP house for renting it out to a tuckshop owner, a Business Day op-ed argued that:
the MEC’s attitude belies a common perception of the usefulness of 
RDP houses. Why would a subsidy beneficiary choose to rent out their 
house for R700 a month? One could point to the failure of the current 
RDP system and the predominant model of providing individual title 
in peripheral areas, where there are few socioeconomic amenities and 
limited job opportunities. One could also point to the success of the 
RDP system in the way it generates new and alternative economies that 
enable people to sustain their livelihoods amid high unemployment. The 
latter situation, however, is possible only where people are allowed to 
make rational choices about their own productive tradeoffs, housing 
arrangements and income-generation activities.217
This issue is undoubtedly a contentious one, particularly given fears of ‘downward-raiding’ 
by higher income groups who obtain possession of subsidised houses. However, there is 
also clearly “a need to understand the choices people are making in difficult economic 
circumstances, with a view to supporting successful endeavours rather than punishing 
people who are leveraging their RDP houses in rational and understandable ways.”218
Another issue relates to the informal transfer of RDP/BNG houses to foreign nationals. 
Participants in both Gauteng and Western Cape focus groups voiced suspicions that 
houses were being sold cheaply for cash to immigrants. They further asserted that the 
community’s effort to evict immigrants from subsidised houses was one of the causes of 
the xenophobic violence witnessed in the Western Cape in 2008. Indeed, according to 
a report by the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) shortly after the xenophobic 
attacks, “one of the most important triggers of the recent violence has been the 
occupation of national housing stock by non-South African citizens. RDP houses were 
constructed to enable South African citizens to reside in them. The sale or rent of RDP 
216  Parliamentary Question No 2692 and reply from the Minister of Human Settlements (2010).
217  K Tissington, K Rust, R McGaffin, M Napier and S Charlton ‘Let’s see the real value in RDP 
houses’ Business Day (31 August 2010).
218 Ibid.
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houses to non-South African citizens exacerbates the housing shortage, compounds the 
pressure on informal settlements and foments community tensions around housing.”219 
It is clear that the perception of houses being sold to immigrants for cash relates often 
to the above mentioned ‘second phase’ of allocation, where private individuals (e.g. 
people who originally benefited from subsidised housing) sell or rent their houses. There 
are also other ways in which foreign nationals “can legally gain a right to occupy RDP 
houses; through for example the acquisition of citizenship by naturalisation or a citizen 
spouse or partner.”220 However, there is also evidence of government officials involved in 
corruption. According to one foreign migrant living in Alexandra: 
[…] I blame South Africans themselves, especially the officials at the 
RDP programmes. It is never easy for me as a foreigner to just get an 
RDP house here in this country. There is a list that will show when you 
registered for the house, what you do, where you live, what is going 
on. Look, when you go to register, they not only ask for a passport, 
there are other documents that they require, that prove whether you 
qualify or not. So the officials that are meant to deliver the houses are 
the ones that are corrupt, because they demand money from people, 
then they tamper with the lists. I suspect the people that are supposed 
to deliver the houses. Even if I had to go there, I can’t just bribe anyone 
I do not even know. They are the ones that send out information asking 
for people that need houses, how much they will charge. I won’t know 
what is happening. They are the ones that delete certain people, 
reallocate numbers, that kind of thing.221
Nonetheless, the fact that foreign nationals are occupying RDP houses is clearly a burning 
issue in many communities, and the anger is expressed by targeting foreign nationals, 
rather than it being understood as a problem relating to the much broader practice of 
South African housing recipients selling or renting out subsidised housing, or instances 
of corruption by government officials when allocating houses. Providing communities 
and civil society at large with correct, up-to-date information would mean that false 
accusations should decrease and real occasions of corruption could be exposed and 
prosecuted.
219 Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) ‘Citizenship, Violence and Xenophobia in South 
Africa: Perceptions from South African Communities’ (June 2008) p. 48.
220 Organization for Migration (IOM) ‘Towards Tolerance, Law, and Dignity: Addressing Violence 
against Foreign Nationals in South Africa’ Research conducted by the Forced Migration Studies 
Programme, University of the Witwatersrand (February 2009) p. 20.
221  Ibid.
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5.4.2.  Maladministration, Fraud and Corruption 
In the Gauteng and Western Cape focus groups, community and CBO members 
described housing allocation at provincial and municipal level as one of the biggest 
areas of corruption in South Africa. A recent report by NGO, Corruption Watch, showed 
that 5 percent of all complaints to the organisation in the past year relate to housing, 
including around “manipulation of RDP housing allocation lists” and “allocation of 
houses to those loyal to councillors or bribe payers.”222 According to Royston and Eglin, 
“people don’t believe in waiting list as the allocation mechanism in practice – views 
are widely held that they are corrupt and that people can pay and jump to the front 
of the queue.”223 One civil society participant in Gauteng stated that the top-down 
administrative system and decision-making processes mean that negotiations around 
allocation are led by the developers of housing projects, which is a problem. There was 
general agreement that centralised systems are predisposed towards corruption and 
there needs to be decentralised local processes for registration which “give power back 
to the beneficiary”. One participant noted that while communities are generally quite 
organised, the problem lies in the system that is premised on the idea of a waiting list, 
with a single name placed on a list. 
A number of oversight bodies have investigated corruption in housing delivery and 
allocation. In 2005, an Auditor-General’s report was tabled before the Minister of 
Housing based on a performance audit of the approval and allocation of housing 
subsidies at provincial housing departments.224 The findings were so serious that, in 
June 2006, a meeting was held with members of the Standing Committee on Public 
Accounts (SCOPA), members of the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Housing and 
officials from NDoH to discuss it further. The report identified a number of loopholes in 
the allocation of housing subsidies process, especially subsidy approvals to government 
employees earning salaries in excess of the housing subsidy threshold. This was verified 
by comparing the housing applicant data on the HSS with the electronic government 
personnel salary database (PERSAL) to identity instances of subsidy approvals to 
government employees who earned more than R42 000 per year. Other problems 
encountered included: 
  subsidy approvals to applicants under the age of 21 years, in contravention of the 
National Housing Code; 
  subsidy approvals to applicants with invalid ID numbers; 
  duplicate subsidy approvals for a specific property; 
  manual overrides of the HSS in the approval of housing subsidies (all users and 
222  Corruption Watch ‘First Annual Report: Turn up the Volume’ (2013) p. 5.
223  Royston and Eglin ‘Allocation Thought Piece for Managed Land Settlement’ p. 11.
224  See Auditor-General ‘Report of the Auditor-General on the findings identified during a 
performance audit of the approval and allocation of housing subsidies at provincial housing 
departments’ (January 2006).
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administrators had the authority to override the provincial HSS); and 
  approved housing subsidies not listed on the NHSDB.225
On 25 April 2007, the President mandated the Special Investigating Unit (SIU) to conduct 
an investigation into “any fraud, corruption and maladministration in respect of the 
development and delivery of low-cost housing in South Africa through the national 
Department of Housing, the provincial departments of housing, the former housing 
development boards and corporations and local authorities and their appointed 
agents.”226 A five year service level agreement was signed between the SIU and the 
NDoH, with the key aims of the project to: cleanse the national housing database of 
disentitled housing subsidy beneficiaries; recover losses suffered by the department as 
a result of maladministration and corruption; identify weaknesses in the HSS, including 
the absence of internal controls and policies; make recommendations on improving 
systemic deficiencies through tighter policies and better control mechanisms; and to 
institute corrective action, which includes civil, criminal and disciplinary action.227 
A Business Day op-ed published in November 2007 reported that 50 000 public servants 
who appeared to have received low-cost houses irregularly had been identified, and the 
state was “in the process of bringing them to book.” The article went on to state that 
the SIU had also started investigations into an estimated R3 billion fraud committed 
between 1994 and 2004 by unscrupulous housing developers and contractors. The article 
highlighted a number of key problems in investigating corruption cases as “housing 
fraud probes at municipal level are mostly ad hoc and narrow in focus. They tend to 
be strictly restricted to those local authorities where fraudulent activity has already 
been uncovered.”228 The article concluded by recommending that in order “to properly 
address the low-cost housing fraud problem, nationwide probes into non-qualifying 
private beneficiaries and municipal employees are imperative. The scale of the problem 
is likely to be far bigger than just public servants, private developers and contractors. 
Left unchecked, low-cost housing fraud may thwart the government’s quest to eliminate 
informal settlements by 2014.”229
According to the SIU’s 2007/2008 Annual Report, by 2008 it had signed almost 400 
acknowledgments of debt (AODs), with an approximate value of R5.2 million, and 
prepared a hundred criminal cases which had been handed over to the police for criminal 
action. The SIU identified the following challenges and constraints faced by NDoH and 
SIU with the investigation into housing subsidies:
  information on the HSS is inaccurate;
225  Polity ‘This Week in Parliament’ (12 June 2006).
226  Special Investigating Unit (SIU) ‘Annual Report 2007/2008’ p. 13. 
227  Ibid p. 31.
228 A Sokomani ‘Stones unturned in crackdown on housing graft’ Business Day (26 November 
2007).
229 Ibid.
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  filing systems are poor, with missing and untraceable files;
  the HSS system is often offline;
  site numbers in the field are unreliable;
  tracing officials is difficult;
  if non-qualifying beneficiaries are prosecuted, there could be challenges in the 
justice system, including insufficient police resources, overburdened courts and 
lengthy court case postponements;
  tracing debtors to sign AODs is challenging.230
According to the SIU’s 2010/2011 Annual Report, investigations into the mismanagement 
and misuse of the state’s housing scheme, which results in subsidies being approved for 
non-qualifying beneficiaries, resulted in 1 291 AODs being signed to the value of R16 275 
157. A total of 625 unlawful beneficiaries were arrested and taken to court in joint operations 
with the South African Police Service (SAPS), and 528 beneficiaries were convicted.231 
In 2009, the NDoH announced plans to improve the HSS, following another audit and review 
process conducted by the Auditor-General into housing corruption in 2008.232 Following 
from this process, the NDoH stipulated that applications must be authorised at a second 
level by a senior official to prevent the manual override of the system by a junior official, 
however requests for overrides can be submitted to senior officials for their consideration. 
The NDoH also maintained that better checking mechanisms needed to be put in place to 
verify information such as ID numbers. According to NDoH, the “application verification 
mechanism” of the HSS has also been enhanced, and applications are now tested against 
other databases such as PERSAL, the government employee pension fund, the unemployment 
insurance fund and the Deeds Office. The director-general of the national department has 
stated that provincial housing departments have upgraded their “filing systems, information 
management and data capturing systems” and instituted relevant training programmes to 
enhance overall performance.233 
Despite these undertakings by government in 2009 to sort out problems with the HSS, 
it is clear that challenges persist across the country. One recent exposé of corruption 
occurred in the Gauteng Province, when in March 2012 gross irregularities in the GDLGH 
emerged in a provincial SCOPA report, particularly in relation to the allocation of over R7 
million which is “related to housing subsidies paid to beneficiaries not appearing on the 
Housing Subsidy System.”234 In the report, concern was expressed that “whilst the waiting 
230 SIU ‘Annual Report 2007/2008’ p. 32. 
231 SIU ‘Annual Report 2010/2011’ p. 24.
232 Auditor-General ‘Report on the performance audit of the allocation housing subsidies to 
municipal employees and the administration of low-cost housing projects by certain provincial 
housing departments’ (March 2008).
233 NDOH ‘Housing Introduces Improvements to Housing Subsidy System’ press release (17 March 
2009).
234 Gauteng Legislature Standing Committee on Public Accounts (SCOPA) ‘Scopa Report on the 
Auditor-General’s Report on the Financial Statements and Performance Information of the 
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list for housing is growing annually, subsidies for housing are being transferred to people 
who are not qualified and approved beneficiaries.”235 The report made recommendations 
that the MEC conduct a forensic investigation into the HSS and report the outcome of 
each investigation to the provincial SCOPA. The report clearly shows that in the Gauteng 
province, corruption and fraud around housing allocation is rife.236 According to the 
department’s Anti-Fraud and Corruption Unit, it has been “working tirelessly to bring 
such culprits to book.”237
In the Gauteng CBO discussion, a former ward councillor described how the Allocation 
Committees in place are corrupt, and how people in these structures only want to 
engage with those who are willing to partake 
in corrupt activities. According to a qualitative 
survey conducted by Shisaka the process of 
accessing a state-subsidised house “is a political 
process” and it is clear that “councillors play 
a powerful role, often deciding who accesses 
housing and who does not.”238 According to 
Winnie Mandela informal settlement residents, 
communication with the ward councillor often 
involved highly politicised negotiations, concerned with local party politics. According 
to one community member, “if you are an ANC member, a comrade, then you get 
first preference for a house.” Numerous participants in the Gauteng community focus 
group accused “councillors of selling houses”, with one participant describing how only 
(membership) card-carrying ANC members are allowed in meetings where information 
is given on registering for projects, and how councillors are involved because they 
influence the Community Liaison Officer (CLO)239 and manipulate the allocation process. 
Indeed, the nexus of local level influence and decision-making between ward councillors 
and committees, CLOs, community leaders, allocation committees, provincial and local 
government officials, project managers, etc needs to be unpacked and problematised in 
Department of Local Government and Housing for the Year Ended 31 March 2011 [Pr166/2011]’ 
(9 March 2012) p. 8.   
235 Ibid.
236 C Benjamin ‘Call to probe ‘rot’ in Gauteng housing scheme’ Corruption Watch (22 March 2012).
237 GDLGH ‘RDP fraudster goes to jail’ press release (30 July 2012); GDLGH ‘Land Grabbers to spend 
time behind bars’ press release (2 August 2012).
238 Shisaka ‘Housing Subsidy Assets: Overall Analysis’ p. 32.
239 Community Liaison Officers (CLOs) are appointed by a municipality to facilitate communication 
between community members and government on specific projects. For example, CLOs would 
be appointed as the liaison between the municipality, community and contractor appointed on 
a housing project. The ward councillor is often responsible for the selection of CLOs, however 
the latter are meant to be seen as neutral by all parties involved. For an example of a CLO 
involved in housing allocation fraud, see GDLGH ‘Corrupt official to spent time behind bars’ 
press release (13 February 2012).
“ ...the process of accessing a 
state-subsidised house ‘is a 
political process’ and it is clear that 
‘councillors play a powerful role, 
often deciding who accesses housing 
and who does not. “
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order to understand where corruption is occurring, or where perceptions of corruption 
are being created in the housing allocation process.240 
In addition to forensic investigations and audits into housing allocation, the media have 
over the years exposed a number of cases of fraud and corruption around housing 
allocation.  A few examples are highlighted here, but there are hundreds of other 
examples. According to a 2011 study by Margot Rubin, in 2007 the media reported 
on Ekurhuleni municipal councillors who were accused of allocating housing only to 
their friends and supporters. The clientalism was so advanced in this case that the 
municipal allocation procedures had to be changed.241 In 2008, the media exposed a 
senior Gauteng housing official who was arrested for ‘selling’ stands that were allocated 
to beneficiaries of government’s housing programme for R100 000 each. Furthermore, it 
was stated in 2008 that there were 7 363 reported cases, most of which were in Gauteng, 
of government officials fraudulently acquiring RDP housing units and living in them, 
selling them or renting them out.242 There were a further 31 000 officials who were 
under investigation “for possibly using fraudulent and corrupt means to acquire low-
cost housing.”243 
Community experiences and perceptions of fraud and corruption around housing 
allocations are commonplace, reinforced by incidents reported in the mainstream 
media. In terms of the former, Rubin describes how in the course of a study on land-
use management practices in three sites in Gauteng, “parallel accounts of corrupt 
housing practices surfaced in the three areas, exposing a wide variety of accusations 
of corruption in the housing process, from putting friends into positions of power and 
manipulating the allocation procedure, to illegally selling title deeds and controlling the 
deeds register. Participants perceived the entire housing process, from beginning to end, 
as quite rotten.”244
While maladministration, fraud and corruption around housing allocation undoubtedly 
exist, there is also confusion and anger over the housing waiting list system, demand 
databases, selection criteria and the allocation process. This confusion can lead to 
240 In both the Gauteng discussions the ‘politics of housing’ in South Africa was raised as a very 
negative factor, particularly the way in which politicians make promises they cannot keep. These 
raise unrealistic expectations from communities about what officials are able to deliver. CBO 
members generally expressed frustration with attempting to engage the state, be it through 
ward councillors, the Office of the Speaker at municipal and provincial level, government 
officials, etc. A common experience shared by participants was around election campaigns, 
when people are promised houses and made to believe that they will benefit from housing 
developments in the near future. Politicians are then not seen again until just before the next 
election. The need for accountability around the system and promises made by politicians was 
raised.
241 Rubin ‘Perceived Corruption in the South African Housing Allocation and Delivery Programme’ 
p. 483.
242 M Plaut ‘South Africa: Behind the violence’ BBC News (2009). 
243 IOL News ‘Public servants face fraud rap’ (22 April 2008).
244  Rubin ‘Perceived Corruption in the South African Housing Allocation and Delivery Programme’ 
p. 481. 
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perceptions of corruption as a means of explaining why certain people received housing 
and not others, even if there actually was no corruption involved. Lack of understanding 
about the allocation processes includes lack of clarify on whether houses are allocated 
on a ‘first come, first served’ basis, based on a ‘waiting list’ or based on other criteria 
such as racial integration (as described above in the Western Cape), or on residence in 
a specific area for ‘in situ’ informal settlement upgrades. Rubin refers to work done by 
Tinyiko Nkuna in Kliptown, Johannesburg, who:
in her work on the housing allocation process in Kliptown, Soweto, 
identified four different housing waiting lists: national, provincial, and 
municipal compiled during a specific housing project. To add to the 
confusion, project-based lists are also compiled in order to prioritize 
beneficiaries from the project area. Although, many beneficiaries 
and those in need of housing assume that ‘waiting lists’ reflect a 
chronological prioritisation of access to housing, in practice there are 
multiple strategies used for allocating housing.245
This confusion and frustration at long and unpredictable waiting periods lead people 
who expect to be beneficiaries to search for reasons to explain why they have not yet 
received houses while others have. The effects of such anger can be extremely serious, 
including: 
  general distrust of local authorities and accusations of corruption, undermining trust 
in the state;
  violent protests, including invasion/occupation of incomplete or unallocated housing 
as well as broader protests targeting counsellors’ houses, public buildings or roads;
  violence against foreign nationals who are seen as illegally occupying subsidised 
housing.
Indeed, the link between xenophobic violence and dissatisfaction about housing 
allocation is widespread in the country, as mentioned in section 5.4.1 above.246 
245  Ibid p. 484. 
246 See, for example, HSRC ‘Citizenship, Violence and Xenophobia in South Africa’ (2008) and IOM 
‘Towards Tolerance, Law, and Dignity’ (2009).
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5.5. Problems around Municipal Accreditation
South African municipalities are eager to be accredited to fully undertake the housing 
function so that they can get around the historically dominant role of the provincial 
departments in housing delivery, and the resulting failures of inter-governmental 
relations. These failures have included: 
  the provincial allocation of housing subsidies on an ad hoc basis and local 
governments’ resulting inability to plan long-term; 
  the lack of a mechanism to negotiate the number of subsidies allocated, and 
confusion over what to do to improve allocations;
  little control over the appointment of developers; and
  difficulties in multi-year planning in housing development.247 
A particular challenge raised by municipalities is that the housing allocation process 
is usually slow and can lead to situations where a project is finalised, but no housing 
allocations have been made. The municipality then faces the possibility of vandalism 
of the empty houses, as well as angry communities who see empty houses when they 
have been waiting for a long time.248 Despite these systemic problems, provincial 
governments have been unwilling to relinquish control over the housing function and 
have resisted accreditation of municipalities. There remains clear antagonism between 
provincial governments and municipalities over accreditation, which was particularly 
obvious in cases where the Western Cape and 
Gauteng provinces resisted giving accreditation 
to municipalities for some time.249 
With the accreditation of municipalities, the role of 
provinces changes quite considerably, resulting in 
the restructuring of the provincial departments.250 
A question remains around how funding will be 
allocated between accredited municipalities and provincial departments when Level 3 
accreditation occurs in 2014 and beyond (see section 8.2 in the annexure below for 
more on the different levels of accreditation). Provinces will require training and capacity 
to play an effective oversight and support role to accredited municipalities carrying 
out housing functions.251 According to a GDLGH official, the province has the personnel 
that municipalities need in order to undertake the various components of the housing 
247 M Mokoena and L Marais ‘The Missing Link in Cooperative Governance and Housing Delivery: 
Lessons from Mangaung Local Municipality’ Urban Forum 18 (2007) pp. 318-319.
248 Telephone interview with West Rand Municipality official (2 March 2012).
249 A Makinana ‘D-Day set for Cape’s housing ambitions’ Cape Argus (27 August 2009)
250 For a comprehensive overview of how accreditation works and changing roles and 
responsibilities of the different spheres of government, see DHS ‘Accreditation Framework for 
Municipalities to Administer National Housing Programmes’ (2011).
251  Interview with DHS official (10 April 2012).
“With the accreditation of 
municipalities, the role of provinces 
changes quite considerably, 
resulting in the restructuring of the 
provincial departments.”
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function and the possibility of secondments are currently being discussed. The province 
is considering moving personnel to the City of Johannesburg and integrating the GDLGH 
Johannesburg regional office into the municipality to retain people with institutional 
knowledge and skills, avoid duplication of roles, and minimise potential job losses.252
While in Gauteng, the Western Cape and the Northern Cape, Implementation Protocols 
have been signed with Level 2 accredited municipalities and district municipalities, there 
remain challenges of intergovernmental cooperation. For example, in the Northern Cape 
there have been clear challenges with the rollout of processes and systems. According 
to Pixley Ka Seme District Municipality in mid-2012, there is no coordination between 
the province and the accredited district municipality and “the roles and responsibilities 
between the Department and accredited municipalities [are] not clearly defined.” 
Further, the district municipality asserts that the provincial department “by-passes” the 
accredited municipality and “communicate allocations directly to local municipalities 
(sic)”, with the latter sometimes changing beneficiaries with the district municipality’s 
knowledge) and the district acts “as fire fighters.”253 These tensions may have a lot to do 
with the specific challenges characterising the nexus between local municipalities, district 
municipalities and provincial departments in the housing delivery process; however they 
do illustrate some of the frustrations felt at municipal level around accreditation and 
housing delivery processes. 
From national government’s perspective, there are also concerns with accreditation, 
which relate to the lack of proper administrative capacity and process to deal with the 
housing functions at municipal level. National government is concerned that the ‘carrot’ 
of receiving additional funding from National Treasury has shifted direction away from 
municipalities acquiring the training and resources required to ensure effective housing 
delivery (i.e. the process) to the goal of receiving more funding from the national fiscus.254 
Indeed, there appear to be tensions between all levels of government around housing 
delivery, including between provincial departments and the DHS. The breakdown of 
inter-governmental relations was a recurring theme in the course of our research. In the 
words of one of the participants in a discussion session: “national doesn’t know what’s 
happening in province, province don’t know what’s happening in the city.” While this 
may not be strictly true, it is clearly the perception of many communities and CBOs, and 
is bolstered by our interviews with government officials.
252  Interview with GDLGH official (12 April 2012).
253  Pixley Ka Seme District Municipality ‘Presentation on Municipal Accreditation’ (13 June 2012).
254  Interview with DHS official (10 April 2012).
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Despite the South African government’s construction of millions of state-subsidised 
houses, there remains a housing crisis in South Africa, which has political, technical, social 
and racial dimensions. Community protests, xenophobic violence, illegal occupation of 
RDP houses, court cases and corruption charges mar the housing delivery landscape. 
The ubiquitous ‘waiting for RDP houses’ (in many cases by people who have been 
on a list for over 16 years) is juxtaposed with an extremely top-heavy administrative 
and bureaucratic systems around housing delivery, and challenges around inter-
governmental relations.
Politicians and officials responsible for housing policy in South Africa, at all levels of the 
state, have sought to create the impression that housing allocation is a rational process, 
which prioritises those in the greatest need, and those who have been waiting for a 
subsidised house the longest. The ideologically charged concept of ‘the waiting list’ is 
emblematic of this. However, the reality is that 
there is no waiting list, whether one conceives 
of ‘the waiting list’ as a mechanism which simply 
allocates housing to those who have waited the 
longest, or as a slightly more complicated device 
meant to take special needs and/or geographical 
location into account. Instead, there are a range of highly differentiated, and sometimes 
contradictory, policies and systems in place to respond to housing need. These range 
from demand databases and the NHNR which attempt to respond flexibly to the rapidly 
changing nature of housing need, in a more or less rational way; lottery systems, which 
allocate housing to qualifying beneficiaries by chance, in a manner that has nothing 
to do with need or the length of time spent on the list; and other, highly localised, 
idiosyncratic and often community-based methods of allocating housing developed to 
adapt to local situations. 
Beyond this, there are new housing policies which appear to contradict the logic of a 
waiting list altogether. There is the Emergency Housing Programme, which concentrates 
on addressing exigent housing crises emerging from eviction or natural disaster. 
There is also the UISP, which takes as its major qualification criterion residence in a set 
geographical area. Neither of these polices depend on the length of time someone 
has been on a waiting list. They do not even require beneficiaries to have registered 
Conclusions and  
Recommendations6
“...there are a range of highly 
differentiated, and sometimes 
contradictory, mechanisms in place 
to respond to housing need..”
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themselves for housing before the beginning of any particular project undertaken in 
their terms. While the informal settlement and emergency housing programmes cater 
for people irrespective of how long they have been registered for a housing subsidy (or 
whether they are in fact registered at all), they can at least be said to be targeted towards 
those in the most acute housing need. But there is also partially state-subsidised rental 
housing delivered in terms of the social housing, and public rental housing in terms of 
the CRU programme (although rollout of this programme has been extremely slow, with 
very few units developed country-wide). Social housing projects do not even claim to 
prioritise the poorest of the poor, and depend on beneficiaries demonstrating stable 
employment and income. 
Ultimately, even on the official version, there simply is no housing waiting list in the 
sense that it is widely understood by the public, as well as by many politicians and 
government officials. There is a range of projects and programmes aimed at responding 
to the complex, multi-dimensional nature of housing demand. The way in which people 
are ‘chosen’ for these projects is far from clear. The process is often shrouded in secrecy, 
bureaucratic complexity, and corruption. This lack of transparency frustrates intended 
beneficiaries (whether they are currently registered or not). It creates the impression that 
there is more corruption than there likely is, and leads to public protest, often in the form 
of unlawful occupation of publicly funded and constructed houses. 
On top of all of this, there are various unofficial, and often illegal, mechanisms at play. 
In the first place, there is a great deal of corruption in the allocation of housing, with 
thousands of public servants managing to get themselves allocated state-subsidised 
houses (in some cases more than one house each) which are presumably intended 
for people in greater need. Secondly, people who would otherwise qualify for state-
subsidised housing often take occupation of houses without them ‘officially’ allocated. 
In this category, there are overtly political ‘invasions’ of housing, as well as less formal 
processes which might involve payment of a bribe, or might just reflect administrative 
error. Third, because of the way the HSS functions, it may be that there are people 
recorded as having qualified for and been allocated a house, who simply have not been 
given one. Fourth, even after a house has been allocated, it may be sold or informally 
transferred by poor beneficiaries in need of ready cash and/or wanting to live closer to 
economic opportunities elsewhere in the country, or within urban areas. 
What is needed in response to all of this is an acceptance that housing allocation is 
not a simple queue-bound progress. Public officials, in their words and deeds, need 
to abandon the language of ‘the queue’, in favour of accepting that the allocation of 
housing responds to a range of pressures which change over time. There are multiple 
entry points into the state system, ranging from being evicted or displaced from one’s 
home by a natural disaster, through applying for and being given a house in a greenfield 
housing project, through to having one’s informal settlement upgraded in situ, and, finally, 
being accepted into a social housing scheme. Concerted efforts to tackle corruption are 
Conclusions and  
Recommendations
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also required, as is an expansion of state-owned public rental housing stock and the 
proactive unlocking of serviced urban land for settlement. Public rental housing stock 
will enable the state to target housing assistance 
more precisely, as it retains ownership over 
housing units, and can prevent them from being 
informally sold or rented, perhaps to those who 
are in no real need, but can afford to ‘buy’ a state-
subsidised house.
Whatever the solution, the housing waiting list is a 
myth. It should be treated as such and eradicated 
from public discourse on housing, in favour of a more nuanced way of characterising the 
rational, appropriate and humane responses to the broad range of housing needs in South 
Africa, which are not currently catered for by the market.
6.1 Recommendations
In addition to the above recommendation to shift the public housing discourse away 
from the current misplaced fixation with the ‘housing waiting list’ and ‘the queue’, a 
number of more specific recommendations are offered to address some of the key gaps 
and fault lines identified in the course of our research. Some are quite specific and 
technical, while others require more high level analysis and intervention on the part of 
government departments. While these recommendations are directed at DHS, provincial 
housing departments, GDLGH, WCDHS and municipalities respectively – they naturally 
depend on collaboration and cooperation between government departments.
The Department of Human Settlements (DHS) should: 
1 Investigate the usefulness, efficacy and cost of the NHNR. The DHS needs 
to further undertake a comprehensive review of the system, taking into 
consideration the issues raised by municipalities around the cost of the system 
(which contradicts the department’s assertion that the NHNR is cheaper to run 
than provincial demand databases).
2 Provide an indication of the extent to which the NHNR is actually being used 
by project planners to link ‘demand’ with housing supply. Also, the DHS should 
address the issue of capacity and training on the NHNR to provinces and accredited 
municipalities. For an effective system, resources and capacity need to be provided 
to municipalities, and more focus needs to be placed at this level. Communication 
between DHS and municipalities needs to be improved, as it is currently quite poor.
3 Reconsider the restrictive clause in the Housing Act around sale and transfer of 
state-subsidised houses. There is research around this issue and it should be 
seriously engaged with by national government, particularly in light of worrying 
“Public officials, in their words 
and deeds, need to abandon the 
language of ‘the queue’, in favour 
of accepting that the allocation of 
housing responds to a range of 
pressures which change over time...” 
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calls for an extension of this period and greater penalisation of those who 
informally transfer their state-subsidised houses.
4 Report on what steps have been taken to address the myriad challenges with the 
HSS, as highlighted by the SIU. The DHS should also report on what is being done 
around the archiving of applicants on the HSS so that those, who are flagged as 
having benefited from receiving a house but have not, are not disqualified in 
future. 
5 Clarify the roles and responsibilities of accredited municipalities and provincial 
departments around housing allocation and delivery, and investigate ways in 
which development planning processes, such as municipal IDPs, can be linked 
more substantively to housing needs/demand capture processes and systems. 
DHS should be in better communication with municipalities, as they are (or are in 
the process of becoming) the implementing agents for housing projects.
6 Investigate the current de facto allocation processes at municipal level across the 
country. There is a critical lack of transparency in housing allocation processes 
and thus the need to look at which points in this complex process greater 
transparency is most urgently required.
Provincial housing departments should: 
1 Produce posters or other materials clearly detailing existing housing allocation 
processes in terms of prevailing systems and policies. These materials should 
explain the technical language of the HDD and HSS in layman’s terms, ensuring 
that all common misunderstandings are addressed.
2 In line with recommendations made by SCOPA, conduct forensic investigations 
into the HSS and report the outcomes. This process should be conducted at a 
high level, and the findings should be made public.
3 Investigate the influence of ward councillors and CLOs in the housing allocation 
processes of current projects.
4 Ensure that municipalities are linked up to internet so that people do not have to 
go to regional offices to capture their housing needs data. 
5 Analyse to what extent the NHNR or demand databases really capture the 
complexity of housing needs in South African towns and cities.
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The Gauteng Department of Local Government and Housing (GDLGH) 
specifically should:
1 Account for the use to date of the HDD as a planning tool for future housing 
projects, and how it has been used to allocate houses on the basis of its HDD and 
Allocation Policy. It should also conduct a review of the HDD (it has been 5 years 
since it was implemented), account for the stagnancy of the HDD and explain 
why Phase 2 never commenced, as well as the rationale behind the move to the 
NHNR, if this is indeed in the pipeline. 
2 Provide an indication of how much the HDD costs to run, and whether the time 
and resources being ploughed into a seemingly obsolete system are appropriate.
3 Report on the undertakings made in 2008 to publish the names of all those who 
have applied, per region and local area.
4 Make the following public in the interests of transparency:
  How many people have registered on the HDD?
  How many people have registered in each area (as captured on the HDD)?
  How many people have registered on the HDD who first registered on 
waiting lists in 1996 and 1997?
  The number of people who were identified from the HDD in the first 
instance to be allocated a house in a project i.e. not identified because 
they were residing in a specific informal settlement?
  How many people, if any, have been drawn from the HDD to be 
accommodated in rental housing?
5 Ensure that all municipalities accredited to undertake the housing function have 
the technical expertise and human resources required to undertake the necessary 
functions in an efficient and sustainable manner. The possibility of secondments 
or moving personnel from the provincial department to municipalities needs to 
be investigated. 
The Western Cape Department of Human Settlements (WCDHS) specifically should:
1 Report on what steps it has taken to “develop a consumer education for 
municipalities to engage with communities about the selection of beneficiaries 
for a project.”
2 Make the following public in the interests of transparency:
  How many people are registered on the WCHDD?
  How many people are registered in each area (as captured on the WCHDD)?
  How many people are registered on the WCHDD who first registered on 
waiting lists in 1996 and 1997?
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  The number of people who were identified from the WCHDD in the first 
instance to be allocated a house i.e. not identified because they were 
residing in a specific informal settlement?
  How many people, if any, have been drawn from the WCHDD to be 
accommodated in rental housing? 
3 Report on what steps are being taken with regard to its WCHDD and the migration 
to the NHNR.
4 Ensure that all municipalities that are accredited to undertake the housing 
function have access to the internet as well as the technical expertise required to 
undertake the necessary in an efficient and sustainable manner. 
Municipalities (particularly accredited ones) should: 
1 Produce posters or other materials clearly detailing existing housing allocation 
processes in terms of prevailing systems and policies. This could be undertaken 
jointly with the relevant provincial department.
2 Publish the selection criteria for specific housing projects within in their 
jurisdiction, which should be prominently displayed at municipal offices and in 
locations within the vicinity of the project.
3 Ensure that they facilitate meaningful community engagement in the shaping 
of housing policies and, more importantly, in the planning of new housing 
developments which affect communities directly. This relates to bottom-up 
planning in terms of the IDP.
4 Investigate the establishment of oversight bodies (consisting of those not 
involved in setting selection parameters or managing data, and officials from 
appropriate government bodies other than the municipality.) These bodies would 
be responsible for checking whether municipal selection policy is being applied 
correctly. There should be civil society representation on these bodies.
5 Establish systems to deal with objections to allocation lists, after the lists have 
been pre-screened by municipalities and provincial departments.
6 Acknowledge that the use of consultants to run systems is not sustainable and 
systems that can be managed internally, and are linked in meaningful and rational 
ways to other processes and systems within municipalities, should be developed. The 
current reliance on consultants and the lack of institutional memory around housing 
policy and implementation is of concern, and accredited municipalities should take 
the opportunity to institutionally realign themselves in a strategic manner. 
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7 Ensure that they engage and communicate effectively with communities at 
settlement, community and neighbourhood level, and not just through the 
politicised structures of ward committees and ward councillors. Municipalities 
implement projects and liaise with communities at the coalface, often with the 
help of CLOs, and it is often at this level that local political struggles are fought. 
Municipalities must be aware of these dynamics and respond timeously to reports 
of fraud in the housing allocation process. 
Civil society should: 
1 Document the allocation processes in housing projects, highlighting any 
challenges faced, opportunities for more transparency, better ways of selecting 
beneficiaries etc. There is a need to pull together in-depth case studies on what 
is happening at the local level around housing allocation and delivery.
2 Push to be consulted on the determination of project-specific selection 
parameters and to be included on oversight bodies set up to monitor allocations 
in line with selection policies.
3 Provide information to communities on housing policy and implementation and 
assist to escalate problems to the relevant authorities/institutions when they 
arise. There is a need for more coordination and government lobbying around 
housing–related issues that affect communities.
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8.1. Housing Act
The Housing Act 107 of 1997 is the primary piece of legislation on housing and sets 
out the powers and functions of the three spheres of government in respect of housing 
development. In terms of Part A of Schedule 4 in the Constitution, housing is a functional 
area of concurrent national and provincial legislative competence. However, section 
10(2) of the Housing Act allows for the administration of one or more of the national 
housing programmes by municipalities through being accredited by the Minister of the 
Executive Council (MEC). The powers and functions of the three spheres of government 
as regards housing are summarised below:
8.1.1.  National Government 
National government is responsible for determining national housing policy and setting 
broad national housing delivery goals; monitoring the performance of the three spheres 
of government against housing delivery and budgetary goals; providing assistance 
and support to provinces and local government; and promoting consultation with civil 
society and other stakeholders on matters regarding housing development. National 
government allocates its portion of the state budget for national housing programmes to 
provincial governments (including funds for programmes administered by municipalities 
in terms of section 10 of the Act). For this study, national government’s most significant 
function is the establishment and maintenance of a national housing data bank and a 
national housing information system.255 
8.1.2. Provincial Government 
Provincial government must act within the framework of national housing policy and create 
an enabling environment by promoting and facilitating the provision of adequate housing 
in its province. This includes the allocation of housing subsidies to municipalities. Provincial 
government is tasked with supporting and strengthening the capacity of municipalities to 
effectively perform their duties in respect of housing development. The Provincial Minister of 
the Executive Council (MEC) for Housing must administer every national housing programme 
255 According to the 2000 Housing Code, a number of systems and data banks have been 
established to provide for this need, including the National Housing Subsidy Database (NHSDB) 
and the Housing Subsidy System (HSS). Read more on these in section 4.2 of this report.
Annexure:  
Housing Legislation  
and Policy
8
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and every provincial housing programme which is consistent with national housing policy 
and the Act. For this purpose, an MEC may, in accordance with that programme and the 
prescripts contained in the National Housing Code, approve any projects and finance 
them out of money paid to the province. An MEC must also determine provincial housing 
development priorities in accordance with national housing policy.
8.1.3. Local Government 
Local government must, as part of its process of integrated development planning, take all 
reasonable and necessary steps within the framework of national and provincial housing 
legislation and policy to ensure that the inhabitants of its area of jurisdiction have access 
to adequate housing on a progressive basis. Local government must set housing delivery 
goals; identify and designate land for housing; create and maintain a public environment 
conducive to housing development; provide bulk engineering services; and plan and 
manage land use development. Municipalities may participate in the national housing 
programmes in a number of ways e.g. acting as a developer in respect of planning and 
execution of a housing project, or facilitating and supporting the participation of other role-
players in the housing development process. Municipalities may administer any national 
housing programme, as section 10(2) of the Housing Act provides for the accreditation of 
a municipality by a provincial MEC after it has met certain capacity criteria (as determined 
by the national Minister in consultation with the MEC).256 
8.2. Accreditation of Municipalities
A major shift is taking place in South Africa regarding housing delivery, as the various 
housing functions (including beneficiary management, administration of national and 
provincial housing programmes, subsidy registration, financial administration, etc.) are 
decentralised to those municipalities deemed to have sufficient capacity to take on these 
functions. As mentioned above, in terms of Part A of Schedule 4 in the Constitution, 
housing is a functional area of concurrent national and provincial legislative competence. 
However, section 156(4) of the Constitution and section 10(2) of the Housing Act allow 
for the administration of the national housing programmes by municipalities through 
being accredited by the respective provincial MEC. Since 2009, the accreditation process 
has been emphasised as a key government priority with a view to locating “the decision-
making authority and funding capacity for local development at the most local sphere 
256 This is in line with section 156(4) of the Constitution, which states that national government and 
provincial governments must assign to a municipality the administration of a matter listed in Part A of 
Schedule 4 or Part A of Schedule 5 which necessarily relates to local government, if that matter would 
most effectively be administered locally and the municipality has the capacity to administer it.
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of government.”257 The process entails delegation258 and ultimate assignment259 of 
housing functions to municipalities so that they are responsible for all decisions with 
regards to the implementation of national housing programmes.260 
In order to be accredited, municipalities must demonstrate sufficient capacity to plan, 
implement and maintain housing projects and programmes that are integrated within 
municipal Integrated Development Plans (IDPs). The aim is for accreditation to result in 
improved efficiencies in the housing delivery process.
There are three levels of accreditation and for each level certain capacity and functionality 
is required. The three levels are:
  Level 1: beneficiary management, subsidy budget planning and allocation, and 
priority programme management and administration (delegated functions);
  Level 2: all Level 1 functions as well as full programme management and 
administration of all national and provincial housing programmes, which includes 
project evaluation and approval, subsidy registration (via the Housing Subsidy System 
(HSS) into the National Housing Subsidy Database (NHSDB) – see section 4.2 below 
for more on these), programme management (including cash flow projection and 
management) and technical (construction) quality assurance (delegated functions);
  Level 3: all Level 1 and Level 2 functions are formally assigned and there is the 
additional responsibility of financial administration including subsidy payment 
disbursements and financial reporting/reconciliation (all functions are assigned).
The accreditation of municipalities was expected to occur over 10 years, beginning in 
December 2004 with nine municipalities and followed by 20 more per year until all 
284 municipalities had been accredited.261 However, the process has been much slower 
than anticipated. According to the 2008/2009 National Department of Housing (NDoH) 
Annual Report, 18 municipalities applied for Level 1 accreditation as per the approved 
Municipal Accreditation Framework.262 In June 2009, the DHS established the municipal 
accreditation Capacity and Compliance Assessment Panel (CCAP) to assess the existing 
257 DHS ‘Accreditation of Municipalities’ Volume 3, Part 3 of the National Housing Code (2009) p. 9.
258 “Delegation” is not a permanent transfer of functions and does not include the transfer of the 
authority role nor does it entitle the municipality to legislate on the issue or direct funding from the 
fiscus. It entails the exercise of a function on behalf of the delegating authority as an “agent” where 
the ultimate authority still vests in the delegating authority i.e. provincial or national government.
259 “Assignment” is a permanent transfer of a function which includes the transfer of the authority 
role. It includes the right to directly receive the funds and assets necessary to perform the function.
260  Certain functions will be retained at provincial level. These are the approval of extraordinary 
applications i.e. special approval of non-qualifiers and the administration of the Individual 
Subsidy Programme (both credit linked and non-credit linked subsidies). DHS ‘Accreditation of 
Municipalities’ Volume 3, Part 3 of the National Housing Code (2009).
261  NDOH ‘Breaking New Ground: A Comprehensive Plan for the Development of Sustainable 
Human Settlements’ (2004)
262  NDOH ‘Annual Report 2008/2009’ p. 66.
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capacity of priority municipalities to perform the housing function in terms of the 
municipal accreditation framework. 
As of February 2013, Level 1 accreditation had been granted to seven municipalities, Level 
2 accreditation to 15 municipalities, and Level 2 accreditation (with conditions) to three 
municipalities. It is important to note that there are Level 2 accredited municipalities that 
have received compliance certificates and signed memorandums of agreement (commonly 
referred to as Implementation Protocols) with their provincial government departments. 
This process authorises the municipalities to administer the national housing programmes 
and manage housing subsidies and beneficiaries, in line with the Implementation Protocols 
signed. These municipalities include: City of Cape Town in the Western Cape province; 
City of Johannesburg, Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality and Ekurhuleni Metropolitan 
Municipality in the Gauteng province; and Siyanda District Municipality, Pixley Ka Seme 
District Municipality, Frances Baard District Municipality, Sol Plaatjie Local Municipality and 
//Khara Hais Municipality in the Northern Cape province .263 The intention is to completely 
shift the housing function to six metropolitan municipalities (Ekurhuleni, Tshwane, 
Johannesburg, eThekwini, Nelson Mandela Bay and Cape Town) by 2014.264
8.3. National Housing Subsidy Scheme (NHSS)
The NHSS was introduced in 1994 and provides once-off capital subsidy assistance to 
low-income households earning below R3 500 per month. This is done through a variety 
of subsidy and programmatic instruments, but predominantly through the project-linked 
subsidy. Over the years, the NHSS has evolved and resulted in a variety of national housing 
programmes, which are contained in the National Housing Code. There is a set of generic 
qualifying criteria that must be fulfilled by those applying for housing subsidies under 
the NHSS for these programmes. However, there are also specific rules that apply to each 
subsidy programme and in some cases there are specific eligibility criteria that apply over 
and above the generic criteria.265 The generic qualifying criteria include:
  Citizenship: applicant must be a citizen of the Republic of South Africa, or be in the 
possession of a Permanent Resident Permit.
  Competent to contract: applicant must be legally competent to contract (i.e. over 
18 years of age, or married or divorced and of sound mind).
  Not yet benefited from government funding: the applicant or their spouse may 
not have received previous housing benefits from the government. In the event of a 
263 DHS ‘Annual Report 2010/2011’ p. 23; information provided by DHS on municipal accreditation 
(per email, 4 February 2013).
264 Financial and Fiscal Commission (FFC) ‘Presentation to Portfolio Committee on Human 
Settlements on Department of Human Settlements 2011/12 Annual Performance and Audit 
Outcomes’ (9 October 2012).
265 DHS ‘Technical and General Guidelines’ Volume 2, Part A of the National Housing Code (2009) 
pp. 11-16. 
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divorce involving a person who previously derived benefits, the terms of the divorce 
order will determine such person’s eligibility for further benefits.
  First time property owner: the applicant or their spouse may not have owned and/
or currently own a residential property. Except for the following cases:
  disabled persons;
  persons who:
 - own a vacant stand that was obtained through the Land Restitution 
Programme;
 - have acquired a residential property for the first time without 
government assistance and the house/dwelling on the property, 
if any, does not comply with the National Norms and Standards in 
respect of permanent residential structures.
  Married or financial dependants: the applicant must be married or cohabiting. A 
single person with proven financial dependants (such as parents or parents-in-law, 
grandparents or grandparents-in-law, children, grand children, adopted children, 
foster children) may also apply.
  Monthly household income: the applicant’s gross monthly household income 
must not exceed R3 500. Adequate proof of income must be submitted.
  Beneficiaries of the Land Restitution Programme: beneficiaries of the Land 
Restitution Programme, should they satisfy the other qualification criteria, may 
apply for housing subsidies.
  Persons classified as military veterans as confirmed by the SANDF: military veterans 
who are single without financial dependants may also apply for housing subsidies.
  Persons classified as aged: aged persons who are single without financial 
dependants may also apply for housing subsidies. Aged persons are classified 
as male and female persons who have attained the minimum age applicable to 
Government’s old age social grant scheme.
  Persons classified as disabled: persons who are classified as disabled, whether single, 
married or co-habiting or single with financial dependants, may apply for housing 
subsidies. If a person who has already received state funding for housing and/or who 
already owns or owned a house, is or becomes disabled, or if his or her dependant(s) 
is/are or become disabled, such a person may receive an additional variation on the 
subsidy amount to finance special additions to provide independent living conditions.
In terms of the 2009 revision to the Code, the following national housing subsidies form part of 
the NHSS and its general framework: individual subsidy, Integrated Residential Development 
Programme (IRDP), consolidation subsidy, institutional subsidy and rural subsidy.266  
266  Ibid.
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This research report analyses perceptions and practice around housing demand and 
allocation in South Africa, looking at the policies and processes operating at national, 
provincial and local level. Despite the South African government’s construction of state-
subsidised houses since 1994, there remains a housing crisis in the country, which has 
political, technical, social and racial dimensions. Community protests, xenophobic violence, 
‘illegal’ occupation of state-subsidised houses, court cases and corruption charges mar the 
housing delivery landscape.
Politicians and officials responsible for housing policy, at all levels of the state, have sought 
to create the impression that housing allocation is a rational process, which prioritises 
those in the greatest need, and those who have been waiting for a subsidised house the 
longest. The ideologically (and emotionally) charged concepts of ‘the waiting list’ and ‘the 
housing queue’ are emblematic of this. However, the situation is far more complicated.
This report attempts to unpack some of the complexity and provide recommendations to 
government departments at all levels. It argues that the housing waiting list is a myth and 
should be eradicated from public discourse on housing in favour of a more nuanced way 
of characterising the rational, appropriate and humane responses to the broad range of 
housing needs in South Africa, which are not currently catered for by the market.
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